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The Opinions of Hughes and Sutherland and
the Rights of the Individual
R.Perry Sentell, Jr.*
A pair of tasks are undertaken by Mr. Sentell in this article: First,
he analyzes and compares the opinions of Justices Sutherland and
Hughes on the substantive and procedural rights of individuals, and
cites both contemporary and present day comment on these opinions.
Second, he probes the more difficult problem concerning the probability
of judges of highly dissimilar philosophies and backgrounds reaching
consistent agreement in particular areas of the law.
I. INTRODUCION

"We are not forced by the letter to do violence to the spirit and purpose
of the statute."1
"[T]he result ...necessarily follows from the plain words of the law,
for which we are not at liberty to substitute a rule based upon other notions
of policy or justice."2
A perusal of these two judicial pronouncements, overlooking the always
questionable fairness of extraction from context, might ignite at least two
querying sparks in the mind of an interested reader. The first inquiry
might be the immediate one: Do these two expressions come from the
hand of judges who, as it seems, entertain opposing theories as to the
proper role of judicial review? An examination of their opinions regarding
the happily never-ending contest between individual and state is here applied in an effort to quench that spark.
Hovering above this immediate plain are the clouds of the second and
more important question which eventually merge with the first and become
a part of the same horizon. It was perhaps Mr. Justice Cardozo who, with
two short sentences, most effectively sowed the seeds from which this
second question grows. Said the Justice: "We may try to see things as
objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any
eyes except our own."3 While rather bold when made, this judicial confession, or the idea which it agitates, has today been carried to ever-expanding extremes. Indeed the inference which would seem to derive from the
Cardozo "eyesight confession"-at least from its extensions-might appear
"Instructor, Institute of Law and Government, School of Law, University of Georgia.
1. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
2. Mr. Justice Sutherland in Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. .310,
314 (1924).
3. CABnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICuiL PRocEss 13 (1921).
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to take on identity as the primary conclusion at the base of our process of
judicial decision. That is to say, it would seem to indicate that given
judges applying opposing approaches to a task at hand and possessing
contrasting pre-Court backgrounds would not be in agreement (at least
consistent agreement) in deciding cases. Hence our second question is
finally formulated for us: Is there such a conclusion so invariably operating?
Again, a detailed view of the individual rights opinions of two judges
possibly so situated seems useful.
And if, as Mr. Justice Holmes 4 and the ordinary practicing attorney 5
believe, it is important to be able to predict judges' opinions, this examination of judicial eyesight hopefully attracts more than academic interest.
Looking to their pasts, it seems obvious that Mr. Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes and Mr. Justice George Sutherland 6 did indeed possess preCourt backgrounds sufficiently contrasting for our purposes. Hardly more
different routes to our highest judicial tribunal could be imagined than the
ones upon which they journeyed.
Hughes, born of strictly religious parents and reared in the industrialized
7
State of New York, played a lead role on the official stage of life.
Receiving an abundant formal education and being projected at an early
age into a busy New York corporate law practice, Hughes mounted an
astonishing compass, indicated by the following points: legislative investigator (1905); Governor of the State of New York (1907); Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court (1910); narrowly defeated candidate
for the nation's Presidency (1916); Secretary of State during the Harding
administration (1921); President of the American Bar Association (1924);
Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1928); and finally,
Chief Justice of the United States (1930).
Sutherland, born in England and transplanted as an infant to what
became the Mormon frontier State of Utah, climbed another ladder.8
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.

REv.

457 (1897).

5. Cook, The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, in 5
LEcrtums

ON LEGAL

Topics 337 (1928).

6. Due to the number of times mentioned, throughout the remainder of this article
the two Justices will be referred to by last name only, without title.
7. Considerable literature on Hughes exists. See, e.g., HENDEL, CHAuLES EVANS
HUGHEs AND TIE SupREmIE COURT (1951); PmarKNS, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND
AERCAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSip (1956); PusEy, CHALES EVANS HUGrIES
(1951) (two volumes); RANSOm, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE STATESMAN AS SHOWN

IN THE OPINIONS OF

THE JURIST

(1916); Allen, The Opinions of Mr. Justice Hughes, 16

,COLUV. L. REV. 565 (1916); Chafee, Charles Evans Hughes, 93 Pnoc. Am. PuIL.
Soc'y 267 (1949); Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1952); Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines of Chief Justice Hughes,
-4b.CoLumI. L. REv. 1190 (1941).
8. See PASCHAL, Mi. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND-A MAN AGAINST THE STATE (1951);
Mason, The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883-1910, 32 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 443 (1938); Stephens, Mr. Justice Sutherland, 31 A.B.A.J. 446 (1945);
-Currie, Book Review, 4 STAN. L. REv. 313 (1952); Elmore, Book Review, 18 J.B.A.D.C.
.535 (1951); Frank, Book Review, 61 YALE L.J. 598 (1952).
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Receiving less than an abundant formal education, he was elevated by the
first rungs to the frontier practice of law and immersion in local politics.
Subsequent levels saw him as a senator in Utah's first state legislature
(1896); a member of the national House of Representatives (1900); United
States Senator (1905); President of the American Bar Association (1917);
close adviser in Harding's "front porch campaign" (1920); and Associate
Justice on the Supreme Court (1922).
For the analysis contemplated here, it is highly significant that Hughes
and Sutherland were contemporaries, a factor which eliminates an otherwise bothersome variable in a comparison of this nature. Indeed, as their
judicial services were performed at so nearly the same period,9 a comparative study of their views in any particular realm affords an insight into
two independently drawn interpretations of precisely the same world's
demands. Thus to ask whether exposure to the ways of "big business" and
almost continuous governmental service in the executive capacity on the
part of Hughes, as opposed to the origin of "rugged individualism" and
legislative approach to government experienced by Sutherland, would
contribute to conflicting interpretations of these demands as they pertained
to individual rights, is but to rephrase our basic question.
If it is human to err, then it is wise to qualify. Accordingly, it is readily
conceded that every case presented to a court involves in some degree
rights of the individual. Moreover, there exists no lack of judicial expression by either Justice here studied. During his combined seventeen years
on the Court, Hughes wrote opinions in more than 400 cases. In sixteen
years of service, Sutherland prepared slightly over 300 opinions. Still the
popular solution of selecting a few of the "major" opinions which can be
deemed "representative" of the views of each Justice must be rejected. Indeed, it might be questioned whether, particularly in the area of individual
rights, the ever-changing fact situations of cases do not render virtually
impossible the objective selection of such "representative" opinions. Then
too, in the preparation of such an analysis, it is difficult to avoid being
stirred by Mr. Justice Holmes' reference to Marshall's opinions: "My keenest
interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great cases,
but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by
"10

Bending to these somewhat opinionated winds, what results is admittedly
an examination of a considerable number of opinions. Slight solace may
be taken in the fact that this is simply necessary. The attack will be
9. Hughes was on the Court from 1910 through 1916 and 1930 through 1941;
Sutherland from 1922 through 1938. This, of course, resulted in an overlap of eight years
when both men occupied the bench at the same time.
10. In Answer to a Motion That the Court Adjourn, on February 4, 1901, the One
Hundredth Anniversary of the Day on Which Marshall Took His Seat as Chief Justice,
in HoLmEs, SPEEcm s 87, 90 (1913).
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launched from three major sides: first, the opinions of the two Justices
dealing with substantive rights of the individual; second, those involving
his procedural rights; and third, opinions where express disagreement between the two Justices occurred. Within these categories the opinions have
been loosely and arbitrarily classified to the extent that subject matter
would seem to allow. Probably, there exists ample room for difference of
opinion concerning the decisions which have been selected, and assuredly
with regard to their classification. Nevertheless, within this forest the hunt
will proceed.
II. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE INDIMDUAL

Substantive and procedural rights of the individual, like Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's restrictions and state taxing powers, "though quite distinguishable, when they do not approach each other, may yet, like the
intervening colours between white and black, approach so nearly, as to
perplex the understanding .... "11 Moreover, even when distinguishment is
possible, Mr. Justice Reed has observed that "all declare for liberty and
proceed to disagree among themselves as to its true meaning." 12
Using these warnings as the pole, the vault will now be made to an
examination of the opinions of Hughes and Sutherland as they occur in a
classification of substantive individual rights.
A. Regulation of the Working Man
Essential to this discussion is a consideration of the views of the two
Justices concerning the extent to which governmental regulatory powers
are to apply to the individual as he earns his daily bread. Be he employer,
employee, or the one-man operator, it is regulation of this nature whichmost immediately touches the pocketbook of the ordinary citizen and
consequently to which, in many ways, he tends to be the most sensitive.
Today's general acceptance of the idea that government either must, should,
or does possess such regulatory power is in part the result of the many past
judicial bouts in which the Supreme Court acted as the referee. Often the
fulfilling of this role was an unenviable task.
While on the Court, both Hughes and Sutherland had occasion to express
themselves in this area of individual rights.
Hughes' first such opportunity (while he was an Associate Justice)

3 Speaking for the majority
was in the now famous case of Truax v. Raich.1
14
of the Court, which held invalid the Arizona statute making it a criminal
offense for an employer of more than five workers to employ less than

11. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827).
12. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625 (1951).
13. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

14. Mr. justice McReynolds dissented.

1962]

HUGHES AND SUTHERLAND

eighty per cent "qualified electors or native born citizens of the United
States," Hughes proclaimed the constitutional right of an individual to earn
a living. In order to do so he was forced to cross two preliminary bars.
To the objection to the plaintiff employee's standing to sue, Hughes pointed
out that it was this employee who would ultimately shoulder the burden
of the prohibition. Likewise unavailing, he felt was the fact that in this
particular instance the employment was at the will of the parties: "The
employee has manifest interest in the freedom of the employer to exercise
his judgment without illegal interference or compulsion and . . . the

unjustified interference of third persons is actionable ....- 15
While paying tribute to the authority of the state under its police power,
Hughes would not permit this authority to camouflage the bald discrimination which this statute aimed at the employment of aliens. Indeed, "It
requires no argument," he declared, "to show that the right to work for
a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence
of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
16
Amendment to secure."
Thus at an early stage in his judicial career, Hughes indicated a sensitivity to the plight of the working man. Of course, here the choice was
probably not an unduly difficult one for him to make-discrimination
appeared upon the face of the statute and there was present the somewhat
uncommon situation that by snuffing out the state enactment the interests
1
of both employer and employee would be furthered. 7
It was not until his return to the Court as Chief Justice, in 1930, that
Hughes wrote his second opinion dealing with regulation of the working
individual. In Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks,18 Hughes
was required to choose not only between regulation and nonregulation but
between rights of the employer and those of the employee. He was thus
brought face-to-face with that special problem of liberty which John Austin
had once described: "But speaking generally, a political or civil liberty is
coupled with a legal right to it: and, consequently, political liberty is fostered by that very political restraint from which the devotees of the idol
liberty are so fearfully and blindly averse." 19
15. 239 U.S. at 38.
16. Id. at 41. Aside from protecting the immediate right of the individual, Hughes'
concern was also with the state's ability, via such legislation, to water down Congress'
exclusive control over immigration, "for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they
cannot work." Id. at 42. This was reminiscent of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's approach
to state interference with imports control: "No goods would be imported if none could
be sold." Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 439 (1827).
17. Indeed, while it is rather easy to summarize the decision as simply establishing
the right of the alien to earn a living, Professor T. R. Powell, writing shortly afterwards, interpreted it the other way: "Under the decision of Truax v. Raich individuals
must be free to select their employees, and to lay down such rules of selection, as they
choose." Powell, The Right To Work for the State, 16 CoLum. L. Rizv. 99 (1916).
18. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
19. 1 AusTiN, LEcvusus ON JUrISPRUDENCE 283 (4th ed. 1873).
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Specifically to be considered by the Court was the validity of an injunction, pursuant to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, restraining the company
from interfering with the actions of its clerical employees in designating
their bargaining representatives in a wage dispute by establishing and supporting a new union. In balancing the respective rights of the employer
and employee in this situation, Hughes' opinion fastened upon the premise
that freedom of choice on the part of each in the selection of such representatives was the foundation of the congressional scheme, a scheme he believed
reasonable in view of the theretofore unsuccessful peace-promoting efforts
in the railway labor area.20 The insurance of this freedom, he concluded,
"instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was based
on the recognition of the rights of both."2' 1
In a sense then-for one of the injunction's provisions forced the company to rehire certain union-leader employees whom it had dischargedHughes imposed a qualification upon the rights of the employer which he
had proclaimed in the Truax case. Yet the two decisions can be rationalized: At bottom again was the element of unfairness and such unfairness
was here prohibited rather than spawned by government regulation of
the employer. This constituted, for Hughes, the vital distinction.22
Leaving the employer-employee relationship temporarily, two other
opinions by Hughes illumine his beliefs as to regulation of individual
workers occupying other capacities. The first of these opinions was written for the Court in Smith v. Cahoon-P Here was involved the cry for
relief of an individual operating as a private carrier upon the highways of
Florida, who had been arrested for violation of a state statute throwing a
rather detailed net of regulation over "auto transportation companies"
therein. The individual's contention that this net, as laid over him, was
repugnant to the fourteenth amendment was upheld. Hughes based the
holding upon the statute's failure to distinguish between common carriers
and private carriers. Conceding a probable intent to apply to carriers
properly subject to such regulation, Hughes declared this scheme, as applied to the individual, "manifestly beyond the power of the state." 24
Indicating a rather keen concern with the position of such individuals,
Hughes went further to warn bill drafters of the evils of attempting, by
20. In Pennsylvania R.R. Fed'n v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203 (1925),

the

Court had denied such an injunction in a somewhat similar case, holding that the
Transportation Act of 1920 was only morally, not legally, enforceable.
21. 281 U.S. at 570.
22. The decision's primary significance, as viewed by writers of the day, was its
indicated departure from the Court's holdings in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), to the general effect that the
employer's powers as to hiring and firing were unlimitable. Frankfurter & Greene,
CongressionalPower Over the Labor Injunction, 31 CoLUr. L. REv. 385, 400 (1931);
Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 92 (1930).
23. 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
24. Id. at 563.
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use of a separability clause, to impose upon laymen the burden of picking
out provisions in criminal statutes which might validly apply to them. He
pointed out that the state court, which had upheld the statute because of
such clause, had itself given private carriers no indication as to which of
the provisions they were subject.
While Hughes undoubtedly was more immediately concerned with the
drafting imperfections of this scheme than with the regulation aspect as
such, the opinion does accent his continuing alertness to possible invasions
of the working man's rights. And if, as has been suggested, "the history
of civilization is in large measure a story of the development of transportation,"25 Hughes' warning to would-be regulators here was a significant one.
The second of Hughes' opinions referred to above, the case of Semler v.
Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners,2 6 also dealt with state legislation
regulating individuals in the independent-operator class. But here the class
was a professional one. The statute assigned as cause for revocation of
dental licenses various methods of advertising, including representation of
professional superiority, the use of displays, and the like. A dentist protested that this regulation violated his rights under the fourteenth amendment and was contrary to article I of the Constitution since it impaired his
obligations on various advertising contracts. Here the Court decided
that police power which had been expressly rejected in Truax must
triumph. Hughes quickly brushed aside the impairment of contract complaint, asserting that such contracts were necessarily subject to the reasonable protective power of the state. 27 To the plaintiffs insistence that
this statute transcended the allowable profession-regulatory scheme in
that it prohibited even truthful advertisement, Hughes conceded that due
to the delicate nature of the public health interests involved, the legislature did indeed possess this power "even though in particular instances
there might be no actual deception or misstatement." Thus, in a forthright application, Hughes acknowledged that here conflict existed and
that the right of the individual must bow to the public interest. It would
appear, however, that it was the presence of this health interest, absent in
the Smith case, plus a somewhat more clearly expressed legislative policy
which, to Hughes, tipped the scales.
Sutherland did not have occasion to express himself on this type of
working-man regulation in as many instances as did Hughes. During his
fifth year on the Court, however, he wrote the opinion in Connally v.
25. Brown & Scott, Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier Under the Constitution,
44 HAnv. L. REv. 530 (1931).
26. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).

27. Hughes' approach here is reminiscent of the one he utilized shortly prior to
this case in upholding the power of the national government in one of the "Cold
Clause" cases. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
28. 294 U.S. at 613.
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General Construction Co.,29 an opinion that fits rather appropriately into
this classification. Before the Court was an individual contractor's challenge of an Oklahoma statute requiring state-engaged contractors to pay
their workers "not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the
locality where the work is performed," and imposing criminal sanctions for
its violation. Holding this statute violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, Sutherland's opinion centered not upon the
lack of state power to impose such requirements upon contractors, but upon
the principle of vagueness in a criminal enactment. Neither the term
"current rate of wages" nor 'locality" were thought to be sufficiently
definite to inform contractors as to conduct which would render them
liable to penalty. Again the bill drafters could prepare themselves. Such
an enactment, Sutherland declared, "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."30 For our
purposes here, this opinion may be compared to that written by Hughes
in the Smith case in that while it did not reach the issue of the power of
the state to regulate, it did evidence a sensitiveness on the part of Sutherland to possible encroachments in this area.31 Unlike Smith, there were
here affected employees who would presumably have received higher
wages had the statute been upheld; but as that aspect could be reached
only after a holding on the vagueness contention, it probably would not
have influenced Hughes' opinion in that case. As to Sutherland's general
views in this area, it should be recalled that he silently concurred in
Hughes' opinion in the Semler case, the situation there presented apparently indicating a line for both Justices to which the rights of the working
individual could not extend.
B. Right of Expression
The right to express one's self, the transmission of an idea, is perhaps
the one which most commonly leaps to the foreground whenever and
wherever the rights of the individual are extolled. Few persons today
would disagree with the classical declaration of Mr. Justice Cardozo defining this right as "the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom." 32 And yet when one considers the diverse and
conflicting undercurrents which surge beneath the deceptively smooth
surface of this freedom, presented as they are in the context of the neverending variety of pressures, hopes and fears which can engulf even a
liberty-loving people, the relative recentness of the judicial establishment
29. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
30. Id. at 391.
31. The case %vascriticized at the time as unduly restrictive. See 39 HAv. L. Rlv.

871 (1926).

32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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%
.
of various forms of this right comes as little surprise.33
In this panorama of the views of Justices Hughes and Sutherland concerning the rights of the individual, account must be taken of the pioneering contributions made by each to the freedom of expression. That the
majority of their opinions here are judicial landmarks whose principles
remain quite active today serves to punctuate the significance of the two
Justices in this phase of American judicial history.
Not being confronted with a right-of-expression case while Associate
Justice on the Court, Hughes wrote his first opinion on the subject, and
one of his most famous, during his second year as Chief Justice, in the
case of Stromberg v. California.34 Being contested was a statute passed
as a consequence of an early "scarlet fever"1 era in America-the "red flag
law." The 19-year-old contestant, whose objectionable conduct consisted
of directing the children of a summer camp in a daily pledge to such a
banner, had been convicted under the California law which prohibited
the display of a flag as (among other things) "a sign, symbol or emblem
of opposition to organized government."36 Hughes, in his opinion for the
majority of the Court,37 expanded the right of free speech protected under
the "liberty" clause of the fourteenth amendment to embrace the exhibition of the flag. His next step was to set aside the conviction upon the
ground, contrary to the holding of the state court, that the above quoted
clause in the statute, invalid upon its face, was inseparable from possibly
valid clauses of the enactment. As the trial judge had instructed the jury
that a verdict of gnilty could rest upon its finding that the flag was raised
for any one of the purposes set forth in the statute, and as that verdict
had been a general one, the conviction may have been founded upon the
invalid clause alone. The contestant would thus have been denied "a
33. Illustrative of the divergency of convictions which can exist in this area, espe-

cially when developments are viewed from "today" and "yesterday" vantage points,
is the following comparison: Writing in 1956, Professor Zechariah Chafee could surmise:
"It is an important question whether the time has not come for state legislatures to

give up concerning themselves with subversive activities and entrust the whole matter
of the safety of the nation to the government of the nation." Chafee, The Encroach-

ments on Freedom, The Atlantic Monthly, May 1956, p. 43. In 1925, immediately
following the Supreme Court's decision in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
Mr. Charles Warren projected: "[T]his most recent development . . . may well
awaken serious thoughts as to whether there is not danger now that the 'liberty' of
the States is being unduly sacrificed to this new conception of the 'liberty' of the
individual." Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HuAn,. L. REV. 431, 433 (1926).
34. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
35. The application of the phrase to this situation is Professor Howe's. Howe, Book
Review, 55 HAnv. L. Rxv. 695, 696 (1942).
36. Former Attorney General Francis Biddle thus defines such statutes: "These laws
attempt to ban the symbolic expression of a point of view." BmDnL, THE FEAR OF

-F1xxom22 (1951).
37. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented.
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fundamental principle of our constitutional system." 8 Hughes' opinion was
hailed as the first actually to invalidate a state statute under the fourteenth
amendment as depriving an individual of the right to freely speak his
sentiments concerning the Government. 39
The next freedom appropriate for discussion here4" to concern Hughes
was that of assembly (as well as speech) as presented by the case of
De bonge v. Oregon.4' A representative of the Communist Party who had
attended and addressed a gathering called by that party had been convicted
under a criminal syndicalism law of Oregon. The basis of the conviction
was that the Communist Party "teaches or advocates the doctrine of criminal syndicalism or sabotage." In overturning the state court's conviction,
Hughes' opinion, by proclaiming peaceable assembly to be "a right cognate
to those of free speech and free press and... equally fundamental," 42 sank
the ax of individual rights still deeper into virgin timbers.
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to
the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the
need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and
free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
43
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.

Pointing to the difference in the outcome of this decision and the Supreme Court's a/firmance of a state criminal syndicalism conviction ten
years earlier in Whitney v. California,4 Mr. Biddle has observed: "If
between 1927 and 1937 the law had not changed, the Court had."45 Differing fact situations in the two cases, however, would seem to render
the basis for this conclusion at least arguable. As Hughes pointed out, in
Whitney "the defendant was convicted of participation in what amounted
to a conspiracy to commit serious crimes."4 It appears that at the time
47
the case was accepted with full recognition of its evident limits.
38. 283 U.S. at 369.
39. Foster, The 1931 Personal Liberties Cases, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 64 (1931); Note,
31 COLUm. L. Rv. 1148, 1149 n.5 (1931).
40. Hughes had written one other right-of-expression opinion in the meantime, Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which for reasons hereinafter explained is discussed in a later division of this paper.
41. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
42. Id. at 364.
43. Id. at 365.
44. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
45. BmrDLE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 105.

46. 299 U.S. at 363. This argument is further strengthened by the fact that Mr.
Justice Brandeis, who concurred silently in De Jonge, %vasforced in a separate concurrence in Whitney to protest "to the suggestion in the opinion of the court that
assembling with a political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian
revolution by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right
within the protection of the 14th Amendment." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
379 (1927).
47. See Note, 46 YALE L.J. 862, 865 (1937); 85 U. PA L. REv. 532 (1937).
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Rounding the circle in the right-of-expression arena, Hughes next had
occasion to expound on freedom of press, a right which he had voluntarily
but unnecessarily discussed very broadly in the De longe case. This time
the offending statute had a Southern flavor: the city of Griffin, Georgia,
had penalized a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses48 for violating an ordinance requiring a permit from the city
manager for literature distribution. The Georgia Court of Appeals had
sustained the constitutional validity of the ordinace against contentions
that it abridged both freedom of press and of religion.49 In Lovell v. City
of Griffin59 Hughes' opinion for the Supreme Court 5l reversed the conviction and declared the ordinance unconstitutional on its face. Not concerning himself with the religion issue, Hughes construed the ordinance to
prohibit the distribution of literature "of any kind at any time, at any
place, and in any manner without a permit from the City Manager."5 2
That the literature involved was not in the nature of newspapers was immaterial, as was the fact that the ordinance related to distribution and not publication. It still struck "at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by
subjecting it to license and censorship."53 Hence, the interest of the city
in maintaining uncluttered streets proved an insufficient balance against the
restrictive requirements of the regulation.
In indicating the importance of the Lovell decision, one authority believed it marked "a sharp turning-point in the law, and checked the use
of permits for activities concerned with speech." 4
While not minimizing the vast significance of the three Hughes opinions
examined so far in regard to right of expression, a skeptic might have
interjected at this point that even yet, in a sense, Hughes had not faced
the acid test. First, one might argue that after getting over the initial hump
in Stromberg of the idea of broadening the coverage of the fourteenth
amendment with the consequence of invalidating state statutes, the later
two decisions followed as a matter of course. Second, one might point out
that no case thus far had presented a specific situation where there was a
48. In view of the number of cases in which they were later involved, it is interesting
to note that this was the first
appearance of members of this religious sect before the
Supreme Court. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 399 (1941).
49. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 609, 191 S.E. 152 (1937).
50. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
51. Mr. Justice Cardozo did not participate in the decision.

52. 303 U.S. at 451.
53. Ibid. The view has since been indicated that the result might have been different

here had the state court not failed to interpret the ordinance, thus leaving "the Supreme
Court with a free hand to construe" it as conferring unlimited and arbitrary power

upon the city manager. Jefferson, The Supreme Court and State Separation and
Delegation of Powers, 44 CoLum. L. REy. 1, 20 n.63 (1944). In view of Hughes'
two prior opinions here discussed and the broad language of the ordinance itself, this
contention is at least arguable.
54. CHA".E, op. cit. supranote 48, at 405.
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clear and pressing need on the part of the state for the regulation involved.
Third, the doubter could contend, the statutes invalidated in all three cases
were unquestionably rather broad, unconditional regulations, clearly capable of creating a substantial hardship. Would Hughes' pen write the same
way if these elements were not present? His last opinion, written just
prior to retirement, affords a partial answer.
The questions brought to the Court by the case of Cox v. New Hampshire1 arose when a number of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of
violating a state statute requiring a special license for staging parades or
processions upon public streets. Taking no chances, the appellants had
challenged the statute as abridging freedom of worship, speech, press, and
assembly as it related to their "information march" on the sidewalks of
Manchester. But this time the individuals were doomed to disappointment.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Hughes upheld the validity of the statute.
He relied heavily on the construction placed upon the enactment by the
state supreme court to the effect that it interfered with expression freedoms
only to the extent that they were carried out in "organized formations";
thus the evils of this interference might be more than offset by the need of
a busy city to control traffic upon its streets. Under these findings and in
the absence of evidence of actual discrimination, Hughes thought the
regulation not inconsistent with civil liberties but rather "one of the means
of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend."5 0 It
did not matter that the statute itself did not provide standards for the
guidance of the licensing authority-the state court had held that this
authority's discretion must be exercised consistently and systematically
toward the ends of public convenience.
Hence the skeptic might have smiled knowingly. When faced with
a fact situation in which a substantial need for the regulation by government was shown to exist, where the regulation was not unconditional in its
terms (compliments of the state court's construction), and where its
language was not specifically leveled at the individual exercise of a basic
freedom, Hughes showed that he was not shackled by a closed mind on
the subject. Perhaps also involved was the idea which has been expressed
elsewhere: "The right to free speech was won at no small price, and it is
therefore necessary to exercise caution in connection with its extension lest
57
reaction threaten the very right itself."
Sutherland also contributed to the judicial history of the right of expression. He first approached the subject by writing the opinion for the Court8
in the case of United States v. Dickey.59 The defendant, the owner and
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

312 U.S. 569 (1941).
Id. at 574.
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L.
Mr. Justice Stone did not participate.
268 U.S. 378 (1925).

REv.

180, 203 (1942).
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editor of several Missouri newspapers, had been indicted for printing and
publishing income tax information which the federal govenment contended
was lawfully condemned to secrecy. The defendant countered that in the
event any law purported to make such condemnation, it contravened the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. Sutherland's
opinion afirmed the dismissal of the indictment on the ground that an
exception in the law, which required the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make certain tax information available for public inspection, removed the ban of secrecy altogether. Accordingly, Sutherland did not reach
in this case the right-of-expression issue. However, that such contention
was made and that he was spokesman for the Court in reaching a result in
effect favorable to that contention is perhaps significant.
Sutherland's next brush with freedom of expression, the well-known
case of Herndon v. Georgia,60 might perhaps be more appropriately mentioned in the portion of this paper dealing with procedural rights. Yet
the case presented a situation somewhat similar to those discussed herein
and was later decided by the Court in another proceeding. Moreover, it
may sometimes appear tempting to identify Sutherland's opinion in this
case with his substantive views on individual freedoms in general. Hemdon was a Negro Communist convicted in Georgia of attempting to incite
insurrection by soliciting members for the Communist Party and distributing literature toward that end. Sutherland's opinion for the majority of
the Supreme Court 6' declined to accept the case on appeal on the ground
that Herndon had not raised the federal question (violation of his rights
under the fourteenth amendment including freedom of speech) until he
petitioned the state supreme court for a rehearing. To the appellant's argument that the federal question had not been present until the state supreme court decided the case by interpreting the statute differently from
the trial court, Sutherland pointed to another case involving the statute
which the state supreme court had decided prior to the appellants motion
63
for new trial6 2 and charged the appellant with previous notice.
When the Supreme Court later took jurisdiction of this controversy in a
habeas corpus proceeding, 64 Hughes joined with the bare-majority opinion
of Mr. Justice Roberts which released Herndon, while Sutherland sided
60. 295 U.S. 441 (1935).
61. Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone dissented.
62. Carr v. State, 176 Ga. 747, 169 S.E. 201 (1933).
63. Comments upon the decision ranged from its characterization as a "flagrant and
inexcusable miscarriage of justice," 35 CoLum. L. REv. 1145, 1146 (1935), to its
being an illustration of the 'least sympathetic but for that reason all the more striking

aspect" of the application of canons of judicial review which are designed to prevent,
among other practices, that of asserting federal rights "as an afterthought-after the

case has been lost on state grounds." Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 Hazv. L. REv. 68, 93 (1935).
64. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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with the dissent of Mr. Justice Van Devanter. Yet in the first decision
Hughes had silently concurred in Sutherland's jurisdiction-declining
opinion.
The final and perhaps most significant of Sutherland's right-of-expression
opinions to be discussed here6 5 appeared in the case of Grosjean v. American Press Co. 66 There he slapped the wrists of the Louisiana legislature
which had laid a "license tax" upon newspapers in the state having a
specified circulation. Holding, for the first time, 67 that a state's power of
taxation might be exercised in such manner as to constitute an abridgment
of freedom of the press, Sutherland declared that "a free press stands as
one of the great interpreters between the Government and the people. To
allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." 8 This tax, he viewed as "a
deliberate and calculated device... to limit the circulation of information
to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 69
The circumstances of the case are perhaps helpful in throwing light upon
what may have been Sutherland's convictions as to the right of expression.
First, in writing as he did he was under the pressure of no binding precedents for, as noted above, this was the initial express subjection of the state's
power of taxation to the freedom of press restriction. Second, the apparently reasonable contention was made that this particular tax was, in effect,
a discrimination directed against the large newspapers in the state. While
this factor may well have influenced his opinion, Sutherland expressly
declined to base his holding upon it and discussed the right-of-expression
problem exclusively.70 It should further be observed that this case was
decided two years prior to Hughes' opinion in Lovell.
From these opinions the conclusion might be drawn that Hughes and
Sutherland were not at great variance in their beliefs as to the individual's
right of expression. Hughes has been observed moving swiftly and effectively through the Stromberg, De Jonge, and Lovell cases in establishing
important judicial guarantees. When the first two of these cases were
decided, Sutherland was on the Court also, silently concurring. In siding
65. Sutherland also wrote one other right-of-expression opinion, Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), which will be discussed in a later division of this article.
66. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
67. 20 MINN. L. REv. 671, 672 (1936).
68. 297 U.S. at 250.
69. Ibid.
70. Professor Chafee thought this fact significant. See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note
48, at 382. The argument might be made, however, that Sutherland may not have
found this discrimination route wholly unobstructed in view of the Supreme Court's
theretofore rather liberal treatment of the state chain-store taxes; for example, in
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (6-to-3 decision holding tax invalid
on another ground), the Court brushed aside a discrimination because-of-number-ofunits objection as it had done two years earlier in State Board of Tax Comm'rs
v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (5-to-4 decision upholding tax), with Sutherland
himself writing a strong dissenting opinion, id. at 543.
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-vith the state in the Cox case, it might well be argued that Hughes did
mnot close the door which he had theretofore opened but simply refused
to remove it from its hinges. Sutherland, beginning with a sympathetic
attitude in Dickey, was strict but not unduly so according to Hughes, in
hiis Herndon opinion. And even that strictness must be viewed with less
suspicion when his voluntary pioneering expressions in Grosjean are recalled.
Accordingly, it would appear from these opinions that neither Hughes
iior Sutherland would unduly restrict Mr. Justice Holmes' classical "free
trade in ideas" 7' and that both would concur in the moving statement of
Judge Learned Hand describing the interest protected by the first amendment: "[I]t presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all."72
C. Color Cases
If today's popular color discrimination relief yardstick had to be applied
to Hughes and Sutherland in this examination of their opinions concerning
substantive rights of the individual, probably neither Justice would satisfactorily measure up to the demands of many. The reason for not applying it, of course, is simply its inappropriateness. The swell of public agitation over man's color and its perplexing ramifications, which was later to
loose its torrents upon the Court, was still in its accumulation processes.
Indeed, during his sixteen-year tenure Sutherland was not presented with a
single instance in which to write an opinion dealing directly with this subject. The three such situations with which Hughes was confronted, while
rather evenly spaced throughout his judicial career, involved surprisingly
similar basic issues.
Two of Hughes' opinions in the color-line province, one written while
Associate Justice, the other just prior to retirement as Chief Justice, dealt
with the availability of railroad transportation facilities to Negroes. In the
first of these cases, McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,7 3 Negroes sued
in equity to restrain a number of railroad companies from providing certain types of luxury cars for the use of white persons only, a result of Oklahoma's statute commanding separate facilities and permitting the hauling
of such exclusive cars. The lower federal courts had dismissed the Negroes'
contentions for the reasons, among others, that the state statute was not
offensive to the fourteenth amendment and that the allegations of the plaintiffs' bill were vague and uncertain. In his opinion for the Court7 4 Hughes
71.
72.
73.
74.
in the

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
235 U.S. 151 (1914).
Mr. Chief Justice White and Justices Holmes, Lamar and McReynolds concurred
result only.
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upheld the dismissal of the bill, agreeing that its vagueness prevented
presentation of sufficient grounds for an injunction. Before doing so, however, Hughes expressed his belief that the statute was unconstitutional. It
was not the segregation of the races which troubled him but the fact that
here the state was authorizing treatment of Negroes which was unequal in
fact. The slight demand by Negroes for luxury car accommodations was,
in Hughes' view, no justification:
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if
he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a
state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under
substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may
properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.7W

Upon this voluntary excursion by Hughes the minority of the Court apparently refused to follow.
Appropriately enough, the second case, Mitchell v. United States, 76 provided Hughes, twenty-seven years later, with an opportunity to demonstrate his McCabe principle. There Hughes' opinion for a unanimous
Court reversed rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
reviewing district court that a Negro traveling in interstate commerce
on a first-class fare had not been denied protection under the Interstate
Commerce Act when forced to move to an inferior coach as a result of the
railroad's compliance with Arkansas' "separate coach law." Here again not
segregation but equality of treatment was the key word, and Hughes, in
what has been called a "particularly forceful statement,"77 construed the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act as identical with the equal protection requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Citing his McCabe
opinion to refute the "insufficient demand" argument of the railroad,
Hughes concluded that "if facilities are provided, substantial equality of
treatment of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused."7
Now forged was a concrete example of prohibited color discrimination in
the transportation field, irrespective of the burden which it placed upon
79
the railroad companies.
75. 235 U.S. at 161-62.
76. 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
77. Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination Since 1937, 49 COLVM. L.
REv. 201, 219 (1949).
78. 313 U.S. at 97.
79. Professor Fairman subsequently characterized the case: "In transportation,
Mitchell v. United States established effectively the right of the Negro to enjoy firstclass accommodations on railroads." Fairman, Foreword: The Attack on the Segregation
Cases, The Supreme Court 1955 Term, 70 HABv. L. REv. 83, 91 (1956). The case has
also been utilized to illustrate one of the values of judicial review of administrative
procedures, i.e., making possible "moral choices" by the Court in certain situations
even though the administrative determination itself is not unreasonable nor irrational.
Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L.
flv. 704, 736 (1943).
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Hughes' other color opinion was written in the interval between the two
transportation cases and involved what was later to become the explosive
problem of the color line in public education. In the much discussed case
80
Hughes' majority opinion 8 ' estabof Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,
lished the principle that a state (in this case Missouri) could not satisfy
the equal protection Tequirements of the fourteenth amendment by
providing for the college education of its Negroes in other states, if it was
offering within its borders the same type of education to whites. While
the composition may have been different, the theme was unmistakably the
same-emphasis upon rigid equality of treatment. Indeed, this equality
constituted the only compromising basis, thought Hughes, for the separation
of the races at all. He found it "impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal
right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by
requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere."8 2 The McCabe principle was
again used to repel the "insufficient demand" contentions of the state.
Writers, immediately prior to the Supreme Court's public school desegregation decision in 1954, looked back upon this opinion by Hughes as
originating a "new conceptual dynamics" which marked "a radical shift to
a less ostrich-like requirement of actual substantial equality in the public
83
schools."
It might be observed in summary that Hughes, while blazing no new
trails with his color opinions, was successful in giving substance to what
had been rather general and vague "equal protection" principles, and in
constructing a springboard for the leaps which were later made.84 Perhaps
he had in mind what Professor Borchard recalled was "the main purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment," i.e., to give "equal protection for the
Negro."8s
D. Citizenship, Naturalization,and Immigration
"The power of citizenship as a shield against oppression was widely
known from the example of Paul's Roman citizenship, which sent the
centurion scurrying to his higher-ups with the message: 'Take heed what
thou doest: for this man is a Roman."86 The relentless struggle of many
80.
81.
82.
83.

305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented.
305 U.S. at 350.
Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HAnv. L.

REv.

377,

293 (1954).
84. For one of the most recent of these leaps see Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454
(1960), which holds, relying very substantially upon the principle of Hughes' Mitchell
opinion, that an interstate Negro passenger is entitled, under the Interstate Commerce
Act, to nondiscriminatory service in a restaurant operated in a bus terminal.

85. Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 47 YAL.E L.J. 1051, 1063-64
(1938).
86. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941)

(Jackson, J., concurring).
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individuals in the United States to attain this shield, which others of us
brandish so thoughtlessly, is reflected in a somewhat separate but unusually
dramatic segment of the Supreme Court's decisions. Of especial value for
the purposes of this study is the fact that opinions by both Hughes and.
Sutherland represented the Court's initial consideration of certain phases
of this segment.
Sutherland in particular, at a very early stage in his Court career, was
exceedingly active in this area of individual rights. The problem which
his first year on the bench required him to face was the eligibility of various
individuals for naturalization in the United States, a question about which,
it seems particularly true that "the cause of laws can seldom be discovered
in the laws themselves."8 7 Specifically, the first issue was whether otherwise
qualified Japanese could come within statutory restriction of naturalization
eligibility to "free white persons" and "aliens of African nativity."88 In
Ozawa v. United States8 9 and its companion case, Yamashita v. Hinkle,90
Sutherland's opinions for a unanimous Court, construing the restrictions for
the first time, answered in the negative. According to the intent of the
framers of the original naturalization restrictions, Sutherland thought, the
term "white person" imported a racial test and was synonymous with
Caucasian.91 This construction clearly excluded the Japanese. To afford
an idea of the influence which Sutherland's opinion in this case carried, it
may be noted that it was not until 1953 that surveyors could hail the extention of naturalization rights to Japanese as "an important step forward."92
No sooner had Sutherland's opinions settled the issue for the Japanese
than the same question was posed concerning "a high caste Hindu of full
Indian blood." Here Sutherland's prior construction caused difficulty; it
had been assumed by many that, at least scientifically, the Hindu was a
member of the Caucasian race.9 3 Accordingly, in order to maintain the
Court's philosophy of the naturalization statute, Sutherland's opinion in the
case of United States v. Thind94 was forced to further restrict the restriction.
The word "Caucasian" which he had imposed as a definition, he explained,
was a "word of much flexibility" and while synonymous with "white per87. Randall, Nationality and Naturalization: A Study in the Relativity of Law, 40
L.Q. REv. 18 (1924).
88. "So far as the naturalization law is concerned, Congress has made this a black
and white man's country." McCovney, Race Discrimination in Naturalization, 8 IowA

L. BULL. 129 (1923).

89. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
90. 260 U.S. 199 (1922).
91. The cases are said to be representative of American decisions utilizing the
"intent" approach to statutory interpretation. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HAnv.
L. REv. 863, 869-70 n.13 (1930).
92. Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HAv. L. R-v. 643,
706-07 (1953).
93. See 11 CALiF. L. REv. 349 (1923).
94. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
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son," was "not of identical meaning."95 Rather, it was to be interpreted
"only as that word is popularly understood."- As thus understood it did
not apply to the Hindu; consequently, the shield of United States' citizenship was not one he could bear. Again, though strict, the interpretation
apparently met with the approval of Congress which, it has been pointed
out, was continuing to permit its application eighteen years later.97
Two years after his naturalization opinions, Sutherland projected his
views of the rights of the individual into a related realm-immigration. In
the two opinions which he prepared here, his literal approach was adhered
to. In the first of these cases, Chung Fook v. White,9 8 the issue was whether
the alien wife of a native-born citizen, in entering the country, was entitled
to the same privilege, freedom from detention for disease treatment, that
was expressly established for the wife of a naturalized citizen. Sutherland's
opinion for the Court, affirming a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, held
that she was not. Unlike his naturalization opinions, Sutherland was not
here concerned with what Congress might have intended; it was what it
had actually said that was important. To read into the privilege which it
had established for the naturalized citizen a similar privilege for the nativeborn citizen would be "usurping the legislative function," and beyond the
power of the Court whose duty was "simply to enforce the law as it is.
written ...."99
In the second case, Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb,1 ° a wife

and infant son, natives of Palestine, wished to enter the country to join
their husband and father, a rabbi of a New York synagogue. Though immigration quotas had been filled, the lower federal courts held their entrance permissible in view of an exception in the excluding provisions of
the immigration act which specifically applied to ministers, their wives
and children. The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion by Sutherland,
reversed this permission on the ground that the exception in the act, by its
terms, modified only the listed class of excluded aliens which immediately
preceded it, namely, those aliens coming from the barred Asiatic zone.
Palestine was not in this zone. Another provision in the quota law which
purported to give admission preference so far as possible to wives and
children of ministers and other professional classes and which the lower
courts had also relied upon as indicating the spirit of Congress was likewise
brushed aside. Recognizing the case as one involving distressing hardship,
Sutherland could understand the lower courts' conclusion, but still he was
not at liberty to substitute for the plain words of the law "a rule based
95. Id. at 208.

96. Id. at 214-15.
97. Note, The Nationality Act of 1940, 54 HArv. L. REv. 860, 864-65 (1941).
98. 264 U.S. 443 (1924).
99. Id. at 445-46.
100. 265 U.S. 310 (1924).
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These cases deal with the legal foundations of naturalization and immigration; it was left to Hughes, as Chief Justice, to deal directly with the
issue of citizenship. This he did, approximately fifteen years later, in the
case of Perkins v. Elg,10 2 characterized at the time as "a vitally significant
decision." 10 3 United States' citizenship authorities were contending that a
native-born individual who as a minor was taken to Sweden by her parents
where she resided for seventeen years, her father voluntarily expatriating
himself from the United States, had lost her citizenship though shortly after
attaining majority she had returned here to reside permanently. Hughes'
opinion for the Supreme Court'0 4 disagreed. Seemingly approaching the
question from a pole opposite to that of Sutherland, Hughes examined
treaties, expartiation statutes, and a hostile opinion of the Attorney General, but concluded that citizenship was a right of the individual, relinquishment of which generally required voluntary action which a minor in these
circumstances could not take. Upon returning to this country at majority,
the individual had claimed her right and was thus entitled to a declaratory
judgment confirming her citizenship. 05 In establishing this right of election
for minors caught in such situations, perhaps Hughes' approach is most
clearly represented by one sentence: "Rights of citizenship are not to be
destroyed by an ambiguity." 1 6 While the decision was apparently welcomed as settling the law on a theretofore undetermined point, one
expressed criticism was that it itself imposed a somewhat ambiguous test;
that is, it left open the problem of when and in what manner the election
had to be made. 10 7 Writers were later to indicate that Congress had utilized
the decision, placing its own standards therein.10 8
Considering the foregoing opinions, the postulates of Sutherland and
Hughes in this rather unsung province of individual rights seem rooted in
soils of dissimilar texture. 109 Of course, it must be conceded that the
precise questions which the two Justices were required to ponder were not
identical. The six opinions here discussed might at first glance lead one to
101. Id. at 314.
102. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
103. Orfield, Expatriationof American Minors, 38 MICH. L. RE. 585 (1940).
104. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate.
105. Procedurally, the decision was acclaimed as materially, but properly, extending
the scope of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Statute. See 52 HARV. L. REv. 322
(1938); 28 GEo. L.J. 125 (1939).
106. 307 U.S. at 337.
107. Sandifer, The Elg Case: Election of Citizenship at Majority by Minors, 14
U. Cnic. L. REv. 423, 442 (1940).
108. See Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HAnv. L. REy.
643, 733 (1953).
109. The opposing opinions of the two Justices in United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931), tend to confirm this conclusion. That case will be discussed in a
later division of this article.
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hazard the.prediction that while itwould be most difficult to conscientiously
assert that Sutherland would not have agreed with Hughes' opinion in the
EIg case, an a fortiori difficulty would not be experienced in venturing
that Hughes would not have joined with Sutherland in all the latter's
naturalization and immigration opinions. But when it is recalled that each
of Sutherland's opinions was written for a unanimous Court, even that
prediction seems extreme.
In a different vein, this segment of opinions would seem to warn that
Professor John-Chipman Gray's famous quotation of Bishop Hoadly is not
to be passed over lightly: 'WVhoever bath an absolute authority to interpret,
any written or- spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all
intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."" 0
Ill. PROCEDURAL RiGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

A. Invasionby Presumption
In the realm of procedural rights of the individual, probably no one device more conclusively or effectively binds the hands of the accused person
than do the chains of the criminal statutory presumption. As with the
development of most liberty encroachments (however justifiable), so here,
annoyingly plausible but nonetheless opposing contentions clamor for
recognition'. On the one side:of the scales is poised the earnest plea in certain instances for efficient law enforcement; on the other the instinctive belief
of a democratic society that prior to conviction the state must overwhelmingly prove its charge. Both Hughes and Sutherland were once called upon
to read these scales.
Hughes' exposure to the quandary occurred shortly after his ascendance:
to the Court for the first time, in the celebrated case of Bailey v. Alabama."' Facing him for disposition was a Negro laborer's attack on an
Alabama statute making it criminal to contract, with fraudulent intent, to
perform services; thereby obtaining an advancement, and'then to fail either!
to return the advancement or perform the services. Tacked to this prohibition was the provision that the failure itself, without just cause, either to
perform or to return constituted prima facie evidence of.the fraudulent
intent. Furthermore, a state rule of evidence prevented the defendantfrom testifying as to his uncommunicated motives, purposes, or intentions.112 In writing the opinion for the majority of the Supreme Court, 11s3
Hughes dealt with this statute on the basis of the thirteenth amendment,
110. GRAY, THE NATurE AND SouRcEs OF rm LAw 100 (1909).
111. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).

112. Indeed, the thought has been advanced that this rule of evidence might wellA
have played -a large part in determining the result reached. Brosman, The Statutory-

Presumption, 5 TurL. L. REv. 178, 186 (1931).
113. Justices Holmes and Lurton dissented.
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"a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race,
color or estate, under the flag."" 4 By means of this statutory presumption,
Hughes held, the state was in effect punishing the laborer as a criminal
for not performing the service or paying the debt; such treatment neces'sarily cast him in the role of a peon, struggling within that infamous scheme
of involuntary servitude. Hence, in Hughes' estimation the scales tipped
clearly against this invasion by presumption, for "there is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can
agreement was volunenduring prosperity be based."" 5 That the original
6
tary on the part of the laborer was immaterial."
Fourteen years after Hughes' opinion, Sutherland encountered the
statutory presumption, in his case a federally created one, appearing in an
act aimed at the unlawful importation of opium. Actually, the presumptions
Were multiple: first, unexplained possession of the opium was presumptive
of knowledge that it had been unlawfully imported; second, opium found
within the country after the year 1913 was presumed to have been imported
subsequent to the prohibitory deadline, 1909. In Yee Hem v. United
States,n 7 Sutherland, writing for a unanimous Court, sustained the validity
of these presumptions declaring them neither illogical, unreasonable, nor
arbitrary. Conceding that perhaps the effect of the statute was to lend
artificial value to the facts from which the presumption was drawn, Sutherland countered that this "is no more than happens in respect of a great
variety of presumptions not resting upon statute."1 8 Facing the individual's
somewhat ingenious contention that the practical effect of the statute was
to compel him to be a witness against himself, Sutherland put this aside
"with slight discussion," on the ground .that the statute itself left "the
accused entirely free to testify or not, as he chooses." 11 9
While it is true that both opinions here discussed did basically involve
114. 219 U.S. at 241. Hughes thus initiated utilization of this amendment in the
area where, according to one observation, it has had its greatest, and practically only,
later-day effect. Note,( The Reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, 47 COLUm. L. REV.
299 (1947).
115. 219 U.S. at 245.
116. Perhaps one of the most realistic interpretations of the substance of the opinion
was its description as simply a recognition that, according to the circumstances, the
degrees of compulsion exerted by such statutes must be considered in defining
involuntary servitude, and that the degree here reached, a criminal penalty, was too
extreme. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 CoLum. L. REV. 149, 161 (1935).
117. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
118. Id. at 185.
119. Ibid. This holding, it might be observed, would have pleased William Howard
Taft who agreed witA the legal philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, in his criticism of the
rule against compelling the defendant to testify: "He [Bentham] says it [the rule]
can only be supported by the fox-hunter's reason-that it is right that the criminal
Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law,
or the fox should have a little start ....
15 YA E L.J. 1, 9 (1905).
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the mental balancing of the government's need for the statutorily created
presumption against the fundamental right of the individual, this, is -about
as far as the similarity can be extended. Accordingly, it' would not seem
fair to plunge blindly into an attempt to catalogue'the two Juistices as
harboring opposing views on this particular subject. The situatib5ns 'which
they were required to examine were simply too different to make such a
classification feasible. In Yee Hem Sutherland was met with a statute carrying the strong moral stigma against opium, a subject commonly regarded
as requiring effective federal regulation. In Bailey, on the other. hand,
while the state would naturally possess an interest in the efficient administration of law, in the final analysis the primary interest to be secured by
Hughes' upholding the presumption would bave been a purely private
one.12 0 Therefore, while the two opinions reached opposing results 'as to
the presumptions, perhaps, so far as the actual light which this sheds on
the basic beliefs of Hughes and Sutherland, the most profitable conclusion
is no conclusion.' 12
B. What Price Conviction
What price, in the medium of individual rights, is reasonably to be
exacted in the name of efficient law enforcement or the collective protection
of individuals in a society? This is a question which at some point confronts
every judge. One writer's definition, which perhaps hits as close to home
as any, of the judge's answer to this question is "a judicial reaction to
utilitarian assumptions." 2- The various modes by which the question was
conveyed to Hughes and Sutherland and their respective reactions to it are
now to be considered.
Hughes' first "stimuli" came early during his first term of service on the
Court in the form of the companion cases, Wilson v. United States'= and
Dreier v. United States.124 The particular claims to be balanced were, on
the one hand, the demand of ai.investigati g~grand jury for the production
of corporate books and records and on the other, the insistence by the.'president of the corporation of his right to withhold these materials on the
grounds of his regular custody over them, their containing personal correspondence, and his belief that their contents would tend to incriminate
120. This observation has also been drawn relating to imprisonment for debt, 'i:e.,
that private interest can "seldom" justify such imprisonment. Comment, 37 YALE L.J.
509, 513 (1928).
121. In striving to shun automatic and dogmatic conclusions in such instances, one
can appreciate the confession once deceptively made by Professor Powell: "If I knew
just what I am driving at, I should drive on more boldly." Powell, Commerce,
Congress, and the Supreme Court, 1922-1925, 26 CoLtnm. L. REv. 521,- 522 (1926).
122. Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MIcH. L. Rtv. 749, 760
(1933).

123. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
124. 221 U.S. 394 (1911).
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him.- "Reacting" for the majority of the Court in both cases, 1 25 Hughes gave
the nod, excepting the purely personal papers of the individual, to the
grand jury. It did not matter that the investigation was actually directed
at the president; the records demanded were those of the corporation over
whom the state had regulatory power which could not be made to depend
.upon the particular custody in which the records were found. In this
situation the personal privilege of self-incrimination would not be heard
as to corporate officers; indeed, to do so "would not be a recognition, but
an unjustifiable extension, of the personal rights they enjoy." 12 6 For purposes of this analysis, it is perhaps significant that even an admiring writer
of the day was forced to concede that in this opinion "Justice Hughes
broadly interpreted... against the right of individuals .... "127 And more
recently, commentators have looked back upon the case as the origin of a
trend under which the personal privilege "has been considerably circumscribed without an adequate treatment of the policy considerations .... ,128
Hughes' next evaluation in this area was not made until his return to the
Court as Chief Justice, in the case of Sgro v. United States.129 Here the
right asserted by the individual, who had been convicted under the National Prohibition Act, was one of those so thoroughly plowed under during
e¢ infamous star chamber proceedings139-protection against an illegal
'earch warrant. In his opinion for the majority, 131 Hughes condemned' a
warrant which had purportedly been reissued, by a simple change of date,
fter. not having been executed within ten days of its original issue, as req(u1redby the Prohibition Act. Declaring that the fourth amendment and
legislation regulating the issuance of search warrants "should be liberally
construed in favor of the individual," 132 Hughes concluded that the "prob,
able cause" requirement for issuing the warrant must be read in connection with the ten-day deadline upon its execution. So read, the reissuance
proceeding was a nullity.
125. Mr. Justice McKenna dissented in the Wilson case and concurred specially in
Dreier.
126. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911).
127. Allen, The Opinions of Mr. Justice Hughes, 16 COLum. L. P~v. 565, 573 (1916).
Justification for the opinion was based upon Hughes' "impatience with wrong doing,"
id. at 584, which, it will be seen, does not exactly square with some of his later
opinions. There were different interpretations of the exact point decided by the case.
One was that the corporate officer had implicitly waived his personal privilege, 25
HAnV. L. REv. 96 (1911), while another thought that the officer was only denied the
right to assert the corporatiot's privilege, Note, 30 CoLnm. L. REv. 103, 106 (1930).
128. Note, Quasi Public Records and Self-Incrimination, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 838,
844, (1947).
129. 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
130.' Glenn, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 22 Ky. L.J. 63, 64
(1q33).
131. justices Stone and Cardozo dissented. Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred
separately.
132. 287 U.S. at 210.
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Later during the same month, Sorrells v. United States, 133 another

Prohibition Act violation case, furnished Hughes the occasion to again
address the issue of the proper price of conviction. In considering the individual's defense, entrapment, for the first time, 3 4 a majority of the Supreme
Court via Hughes' opinion 135 reversed the trial court's refusal to submit

the issue to the jury. Hughes viewed as clearly sufficient to warrant the
finding of entrapment the Government agent's actions in misrepresenting
himself to the individual, playing upon his war experience sympathies,
and repeatedly begging him for liquor. Disagreement was expressed with
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in two respects. In utilizing
the principle of legislative intent, Hughes held that an individual so
entrapped was not guilty under the Prohibition Act but that the question
must be determined by the jury. The concurring opinion argued that
while the individual was guilty in the sense that he had committed the act
which the law prohibited, it was the trial court's duty to dismiss an indictment founded on such entrapment without permitting the issue to go to the
jury. To this argument Hughes retorted that "clemency is the function bf
the Executive." 36 Deploring the Government agent's actions, Hughes
thought that "such a gross abuse of authority given for the purpose of
detecting and punishing crime, and not for the making of criminals, deserves the severest condemnation....,137

Thus in the Court's initial construction of the entrapment defense,
Hughes established what might be called in a technical sense an ultraliberal standard in favor of the individual; that is, when the jury found
that the defendant's rights had been so invaded, even though he had
actually committed the literally prohibited act, he was to be regarded as
innocent. However, in a less technical but more practical sense, the
concurring opinion would seem the more libertarian. For in preventing the
case from being transferred to the jury, it would make the court itself, in
the interest of proper judicial administration, the guardian of the defendants rights.
Hughes' final opinion to be examined here was rendered in the celebrated
case of Brown v. Mississippi.138 Again protecting the rights of the individual, this time against state encroachment, Hughes' opinion for a unanimous Court spread the mantle of due process in the fourteenth amendment
to cover reversal of a murder conviction based solely upon confessions
admittedly coerced by brutality. Paying tribute to the freedom of the state
133. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
134. Note, 41 YALE L.J. 1249, 1251 (1932); 1 GEo. WASa. L. RxV. 371 (1933).
135. Justices Roberts, Stone, and Brandeis concurred separately. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
136. 287 U.S. at 449.
137. Id. at 441.
138. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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to: regulate the procedure of its courts, Hughes qualified this freedom as
one "of constitutional government
limited by the requirement of due
process of law," not to be substituted by a "trial by ordeal." 13 The
methods used in obtaining the confessions, he held, were "a wrong so
fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial
and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void." 140 At the time, the
opinion was deemed "especially significant" due to the few such cases
which had been before the Court, 141 and was elsewhere read as definitely
extending the fourteenth amendment to guarantee protection against selfincrimination. 14
It was Sutherland's lot to juggle conviction prices in two cases and in
neither would he buy the Government's product. In considering the individual's unlawful search and seizure contention in Byars v. United States,143
Sutherland had to determine both a question of law and a question of fact
in order to prevent what he felt was infringement by the federal government upon the procedural rights of the individual. In his opinion for a
unanimous Court, he overturned the conviction for possession of certain
counterfeit stamps by declaring the law to invalidate a search warrant
based merely upon the afflant's "belief," and determining the fact that there
had been such participation in the search by a federal officer as to render
it a federal undertaking. 4 4 It was not material, said Sutherland, that the
wrongful search actually turned up evidence of the federal statute's violation: "A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made
lawful by what it brings to light .... 145 Such invasions, he concluded,
"strike at the substance of the constitutional right."146
In the second case, Powell v. Alabama,147 the Supreme Court added a
139. Id. at 285.
140. Id. at 286.
141. 36 COLTm. L. REv. 832, 833 (1936).
142. 12 IND. L.J. 66 (1936). As recently pointed out, the physical violence employed
in this case made it unnecessary for the Court to decide a technical question as to the
confession rule which later became important when the coercion employed was more
"psychological," viz., whether it was the methods used which rendered the confessions
void or their unreliability. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems
of Criminal Justice,8 DE PAur. L. REV. 213, 235 (1959).
143. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
144. It was necessary for Sutherland to construe this into a federal search because
of the Court's holding in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that the
fourth amendment did not exclude from a federal trial evidence wrongfully obtained
by state officials. Sutherland's holding here was tagged the "silver platter" doctrine by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), and
continued to rule the Court's decisions until 1960 when the doctrine was overturned
in the case of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See Kamisar, Wolf and
Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MiNN.
L. REV. 1083 (1959).

145. 273 U.S. at 29. For a discussion of this point see Corwin, The Supreme Court's
Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1930).
146. 273 U.S. at 34.
147. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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new link in the chain of the fourteenth amendment and Sutherland's opinion for the majority' 48 became one of his most famous. 49 Involved was the
fairness of the trial accorded the well known "Scottsboro boys" in their
rape prosecution by the State of Alabama. In reversing their conviction,
Sutherland's opinion read into the fourteenth amendment for the first
time1 50 the guarantee of right to counsel in a capital case. ^After doing so,
he proceeded to declare that the trial judge's appointment of "all the members of the bar" for the arraignment of the boys and the rather vague designation of a defense attorney on the morning of the trial "was little more
than an expansive gesture"'-' and did not constitute the required "effective
appointment of counsel." 52 The defendant in such a case could not be
"stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and
prepare his defense,"153 one of the "immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government .... ,,154
While Sutherland's opinion was hailed as "undoubtedly stretching due
process to a point hitherto unknown,"155 others pointed realistically to its
express limitations. 15 It was also pointed out that the case could have
reasonably been decided upon narrower grounds: either upon the "mob
violence" holding of Moore v. Dempsey,15 7 or upon just the denial of opportunity to employ counsel prior to trial. 5 8 Thus it might be said that in
requiring an "effective appointment of counsel," Sutherland was voluntarily
setting an above-the-market price on conviction in such cases. 15 9
A conclusion is undoubtedly demanded here that both Hughes and
Sutherland were notably sensitive to the rights of the individual in this
area of the law concerning encroachments by both federal and state law
enforcement processes. Considered from this viewpoint exclusively, Hughes'
opinion in the Wilson case is the only black mark upon the record. And
yet, in view of his expressions in Sgro, Sorrells, and Brown, in all of which
148. Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented.
149. One writer dates the development of constitutional doctrine in the field of
"federal judicial supervision of state criminal justice" from the decision in this case.
Allen, supra note 142, at 215.

150. Note, 1947-48 Term of Supreme Court: Appointment of Counsel Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 1076, 1077 (1948); 8 Wis. L. REv. 370
(1933).
151. 287 U.S. at 56.
152. Id. at 71.

153. Id. at 59.
154. Id. at 68.
155. 23 J. Cami. L., C. &P.S. 841, 842 (1933).
156. Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1932, 47 HAuv. L. REv. 245, 277 (1933).

157. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). For a statement of this point see 23 J. CnFm. L., C. & P.S.
841, 844 (1933).
158. 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1430, 1431 (1932).
159. Sutherland's dissenting opinion in a later case, Nardone v. United States, 302

U.S. 379 (1937), indicated at least one area where he did not consider law enforcement prices too high. This opinion will be discussed in a later division of this paper.
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Sutherland silently joined, plus his silent support of Sutherland's opinion
in Powell, it is difficult to assert that he was really the less sensitive of the
two. Moreover, in attempting to formulate any such judgment of individual contributions here, the speculation must be placed at the top of
the list that probably both Justices, in each of these opinions, were inwardly fighting another battle. For, as postulated by one writer, "perhaps
more than in any other field, the manner of dealing with persons accused of
crime is of concern to the state alone." 160
C. Trial by Jury
"[T]he English law of evidence .

.

. " wrote Professor James Bradley

Thayer in 1898, "is the child of the Jury."1 1 While not disagreeing with
this thesis, a present day English jurist, in speaking of the jury institution,
was moved to observe: "Theoretically it ought not to be possible to successfully enforce the criminal law by such means."1 62 What then is the
,answer to this indicated paradox? If the latter assertion is true, then
what accounted for the former? And what, in theory or otherwise, is
actually objectionable to trial by jury? Perhaps Dean Francis X. Busch
.summarizes the answers to both these questions: "ilts faults admitted,occasional verdicts induced by passion, prejudice, ignorance and mis,directed advocacy-it stands out in the long history of trial methods as
the surest safeguard yet devised to protect the rights and redress the
*wrongs of the common man." 163 Moreover, predicts Dean Busch, "the right
,of trial by jury, still definitely associated in the public mind as one of the
-ancient and proven safeguards of individual rights,... will continue as an
essential part of our judicial system." 164 Now to be examined are the
,comparative roles played by Hughes and Sutherland in furthering the
.continuance of this much-discussed right.
Hughes wrote three opinions, all while Chief Justice, in which the jury
trial system was involved. In each of these cases he took for granted the
existence of the right itself but was concerned with the fairness of the
.particular manner in which it had been accorded. That he consistently
maintained a high standard for this measure of fairness may here be recalled. In Aldridge v. United States165 Hughes' opinion for the majority
of the Court 166 reversed a District of Columbia murder conviction, finding
unfairness in the trial judge's refusal to permit the Negro defendant to
160. Nutting, The Supreme Court, The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal
Cases, 3U. Cm. L. REv. 244 (1936).
161. ThAYm, A PIuLtmaARm
TAEATiSE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47

(1898).
162. DIEviN, TmIAL BY JuRY 5 (1956).
163. BuscH, Preface to LAw AND TACTICS IN Jury TwALs at v (1949).

164. Ibid.
165. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
166. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
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question prospective jurors on their voir dire as to racial prejudice, in view
of the fact that the deceased was a white man. In shading the "general
rule" of the day "that the extent to which voir dire examinations should
go rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge,"' 67 Hughes enunciated
his fear in certifying the possibility of allowing a prejudiced juror to sit.
"No surer way," he declared, "could be devised to bring the processes of
justice into disrepute." 168 Surveyors posted the case as one of the "striking
instances" of the Supreme Court's "concern with practice and procedure
69
in the lower federal courts."
Hughes' other two opinions in the jury trial realm concerned two of the
"Scottsboro boys," whose earlier convictions had been overturned by
Sutherland for denial of right to counsel, as discussed above. 170 In Norris
v. Alabama,'7 ' Hughes' opinion for the Court' 7 2 reversed the second conviction of one of the boys on the grounds, contrary to the holding of the
state supreme court, that the "long-continued, unvarying, and wholesale
exclusion of negroes from jury service" in both the county of indictment
and the county of trial denied him equal protection of the laws. 7 3 In
order to reach this conclusion, which the Court had been accused of purposely avoiding, 7 4 Hughes was forced into a pure determination of fact
and, consequently, an examination of the evidence which had been presented during the trial. This was necessary, he held, to determine whether
a federal right, specifically claimed in the state court, had been "denied
in substance and effect." 7 5 It was this delibrate approach of the opinion,
which "seems to depart from long-established practice ... ."176 rather than
177
expansion of individual rights, which rustled the leaves of comment.
The other case, Patterson v. Alabama,7 8 considered and decided at the
same time by the Court, presented the same contention as Norris but with
the supposedly vital distinction that his bill of exceptions had been struck
by the state supreme court upon the sole ground that it had not been filed
within the time required by state rules of procedure. Accordingly, con167. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 17 Gxo. L.J. 13, 15 (1928).
168. 283 U.S. at 315.
169. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1930, 45 HARv. L. REv. 271, 300 n.52 (1931). Others saw it as a mere extension of a
rule "well settled" in state courts. 5 So. CAL. L. Ilv. 166, 167 (1931).
170. See text accompanying notes 147-59 supra.

171. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
172. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not participate.
173. 294 U.S. at 597.
174. Note, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service, 29 ILL. L. Rv. 498,
499 (1934).
175. 294 U.S. at 590.
176. Note, 55 HAIv. L. REv. 644, 649 (1942).
177. See 35 COLUm. L. REy. 776, 777 (1035); 33 Mics. L. RPv. 1252, 1254 (1935).
The decision "gave a new impetus to the fight against this type of discrimination."

Note, 52 HARAv. L. REy. 823, 828 (1939).
178. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
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tended the state, no federal right had been denied. Conceding that the
state court "was undoubtedly at liberty"7 9 so to act, Hughes' opinion for
the same members of the Court' 80 nevertheless remanded the case on the
basis of Norris: "We are not satisfied that the court would have dealt with
the case in the same way if it had determined the constitutional question as
182
we have determined it."181 "We should not foreclose that opportunity."
Thus, with the life of the individual at stake, Hughes, confessing that his
conviction could be legally reaffirmed in the state court, could not bring
183
himself to close the door without one last invitation for reconsideration.
While none of Sutherland's four opinions dealing with trial by jury are
inconsistent, they do render somewhat difficult the attempt to derive a
conclusion as to his basic beliefs upon the subject. The matter first confronted him during his second year on the Court in the case of Riddle V.
Dyche. 84 Considered was the habeas corpus plea of an individual contesting a felony conviction on the ground that it had been accomplished by a
jury of only eleven men. Following rather rigid procedural ideas, which
have been previously observed, Sutherland for a unanimous Court wrote
that the use of habeas corpus here, "an independent civil suit,"185 constituted an improper attempt to impeach the trial record collaterally and
could not be allowed. Thus the jury-defect contention was not reached.
Yet, as will be noted, Sutherland himself was later to recall the opinion as
indicating a less than absolute requirement of trial by jury.
His next opinion considered the right in an entirely different context.
In Michaelson v. United States,186 Sutherland, again for a unanimous
Court, held constitutional a provision of the Clayton Act requiring a jury
trial at the instance of the accused in certain contempt proceedings. In
doing so, he was facing what Professors Frankfurter and Landis had previously described as "one of those vexing constitutional issues . . ." whose
"solution is much entangled with old English history," at the bottom of
which "lies the doctrine of the separation of powers." 87 In permitting this
extension of the right to trial by jury, Sutherland reached a number of
179. Id. at 605.
180. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not participate.
181. 294 U.S. at 606.
182. Id. at 607.
.183. Of this opinion it was said that the limits of the practice of remanding "have
been extended very appreciably .... " 35 CoLum. L. RBv. 941, 942 (1935). In fact,
Patterson was retried in the state, reconvicted, and imprisoned with the Supreme
Court denying certiorari, 302 U.S. 733 (1937). See 2 FREuND, SUTHEMLAND, Hown &
BROVWN, CONSTrrTrnONAL LAW 1018 (1954).
184. 262 U.S. 333 (1923).
185. Id. at 336.
186. 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
187. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in "Inferioi' Federal Cburts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAnv. L. Ry. 1010,
1011-12 (1924).
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interesting determinations. First, in overcoming the lower court's contention that the court's power to enforce its equity decrees was "inherent" and
hence beyond congressional control, he construed the extension to relate
exclusively to criminal contempts-"between the public and the defendant"' 88-which constituted "an independent proceeding at law . .

"189

Over these contempts, said Sutherland, and as to inferior federal courts,
Congress could constitutionally extend the right of jury trial. 190 Second, to
the argument that the individuals here attempting to utilize the provision
were on strike and hence not "employees," Sutherland flatly asserted that
the employment status was not a prerequisite. Third, and rather uncharacteristically, he concluded that though the word "may" in the provision "strictly and grammatically considered" limited the jury-trial grant to
the judge's discretion, to so construe it "would be to subvert the plain intent
and good sense of the statute."191 Regardless of the correctness of the
technical distinctions which Sutherland drew here, one might have thought
his approach considerably different from the attitude indicated in the
Riddle case. It must be remembered, however, that in the end he was
only holding that Congress could provide a jury trial in certain well-defined
cases. Indeed, his next opinion appeared to confirm that he had undergone
no real change of heart.
The well known case of Patton v. United States'92 brought before the
Justices the question of whether individuals charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment could, after their trial in federal district court had
progressed substantially, give binding consent to the trial's proceeding with
only eleven jurors after one juror had become ill. Instead of pursuing the
line of reasoning which one might have deemed his Michaelson opinion to
indicate, Sutherland's statement for the Court 93 answered in the affirmative.
In following a theory previously postulated' 94 but far from settled or
demanded by precedents in the lower courts, 195 Sutherland's opinion gave
birth in the Supreme Court to the view that the right to trial by jury as
guaranteed by the Constitution (article III and the sixth amendment) is a
188. 266 U.S. at 67.
189. Id. at 64.
190. Professor Powell intimated his belief that the holding was so narrowly confined
as to lack much significance. Powell, Commerce, Congress, and the Supreme Court,
1922-1925, 26 COLUm. L. Iliw. 521, 547 n.56 (1926).
191. 266 U.S. at 70. The opinion was criticized for its deficiency in establishing any
correct standards, Note, 9 MINN. L. RBv. 368, 372 (1925), and praised for bringing
"to a satisfactory conclusion" a long-standing problem, 19 ILL. L. RPv. 449 (1925).
192. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
193. Mr. Chief Justice Taft did not participate. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone
concurred in the result.
194. See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MIcH. L. REv.
695, 738 (1927).
195. See Griswold, The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal
Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 655 (1934); 30 CoLmr. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1930).
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privilege which could be waived-not only to the extent of one juror, but
entirely. Citing his Riddle opinion as "out of harmony with the notion that
the presence of a jury is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of
the court in a criminal case,"1 96 Sutherland thought that to deny the power
of waiver here would be to "convert a privilege into an imperative requirement."1 97 To the contention that public policy prohibited such waivers,
especially as to felonies, Sutherland was of the opinion that the degree of
the crime made no substantial difference, pointing out further that this
same public policy allowed an individual to plead guilty "and thus dispense with a trial altogether."'9 8 At any rate, he concluded, "The public
policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public
policy of another."' 99
At this point it might have appeared that as to the individuars right to
trial by jury, Sutherland had traveled the full circle. But one last stop yet
remained. This stop was made in his opinion for a unanimous Court in
District of Columbia v. Colts,2o a case making inquiry as to whether the
federal constitution required a jury trial for an individual summarily convicted of reckless driving in the police court of the District of Columbia.
Apparently deviating somewhat from his settled course, Sutherland held
that it did. Professing to remember the common law's summary proceedings as well as to recognize that certain "petty offenses" were not included
within the constitutional jury-trial guaranty,201 Sutherland imposed as a
test for these offenses not the measure of the punishment provided but
"the nature of the offense." 202 Reckless driving, he found, "is an act of
such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be
to shock the general moral sense."20 3 Thus the crime fell within the guaranty of article I11.204
A summary comparison of the beliefs of the two Justices concerning the
196. 281 U.S. at 300.
197. Id. at 298.
198. Id. at 305. The opinion also contained dictum to the effect that the Government's consent was necessary for such a waiver and it may be that this requirement
was imposed with a view to satisfying the interests of "public policy."
199. Id at 306. While writers seemed to feel the necessity of justifying the decision,
the apparent general conclusion was that it could be done. See Griswold, supra note
195, at 669; Busci, op. cit. supra note 163, at 64; 10 B.U.L. REv. 546, 548 (1930).
200. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
201. See Franlkfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926). For a recent and sharp
attack on this position and especially on the above article see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have
No Peersl, 26 U. Cmr. L. Ray. 245 (1959), which, while conceding the existence of summary trials in England and the colonies, argues that these less serious offenses were not
excluded from the guaranty of the Constitution.
202. 282 U.S. at 73.
203. Ibid.
204. One commentator thought that as compared with the Patton opinion, this
decision gave "effect to a somewhat inconsistent policy." Comment, The Petty Offense
Category and Trial by Jury, 40 YALE L.J. 1303, 1305 (1931).
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right to trial by jury cannot be arrived at easily. Hughes' opinions evidence
a continuing and alert insistence upon absolute fairness in the accordance
of this right.205 Certainly, none of Sutherland's opinions indicate disagreement with this principle. With aspects of the existence of the right itself,
Hughes was not confronted. Sutherland, on the other hand, has been
observed permitting Congress to provide the right in a rapidly developing
field of the law (Michaelson), cloaking the absolute right with an important limitation (Patton), and extending it to an area which previously had
been considered rather insignificant (Colts). Except for the Colts opinion, Sutherland cannot be said to have evidenced a particular tenderness toward the individual's right to trial by jury.20 6 Perhaps an appropriate general conclusion for this section was that drawn by Father
Snee: "A fair trial is indispensable for justice; trial by a common-law jury
is not, but it is one of the fairest methods known and has met the test of
20 7
centuries in the Anglo-American tradition."
D. Improper Conduct of Court Officials
Basic to procedural rights of the individual in America is the assurance
that when accused of crime he enters upon his trial presumed an innocent
man and remains so until proven guilty by the state. Moreover, in the
attempt to rebut this presumption various though sometimes illusive
standards of fair play are to be maintained. Perhaps at the bottom of these
standards is the belief that though criminal prosecution must and should
be vigorous, somewhere along the line an impartial analysis is essential.
The libertarian John Stuart Mill ranked this "impartiality" as "that first
of judicial virtues . .. , an obligation of justice. .. , a necessary condition
of the fulfillment of the other obligations of justice." 2 8 Whether in fact
such a standard has been maintained in particular instances is the often
thankless decision which the Supreme Court is called upon from time to
time to render. Fortunately for this survey, both Hughes and Sutherland
each worded one such decision.
Hughes' composition was formulated as the opinion for a unanimous
Court in the case of Querciav. United States,209 which involved a narcotics
conviction in a federal district court. Prior to the jury's verdict, the trial
judge had charged in regard to a particular mannerism of the defendant:
"It is rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of
205. Hughes wrote one other jury trial opinion, United States v. Wood, 299
123 (1936), to be later discussed herein.
206. Sutherland's other jury trial majority opinion, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
(1935), fits more appropriately into a later portion of, this article.
207. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GovxnvrsrT UNDER LAw 91,
(Sutherland ed. 1956).
208. Mill, Utilitarianism (1914), in FuLima, THE lhoLrMs OF JtumspRuDENcE
517 (temp. ed. 1949).
209. 289 U.S. 466 (1933).

U.S.
474
116
459,
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lying."210 In reversing this conviction, Hughes drew upon the words of
Sir Matthew Hale to recognize that the federal judge in such a trial is
not a mere moderator but that he may assist the jury "by showing them
his opinion even in matters of fact."211 Still, said Hughes, there is a limit:
"[A]n expression of opinion upon the evidence . . .should not be one13
sided."212 The limits in this case, he concluded, had been transcended.
The judge, however, is not the only cog in the wheels of justice which
must turn unweighted-there is also the prosecutor. Dean Pound has
complained:
Under our legal system the way of the prosecutor is hard, and the need of "getting
results" puts pressure upon prosecutors to use the "third degree," to suppress evidence, to bulldoze witnesses, and generally to indulge in that lawless enforcement
2 14
of law which produces a vicious circle of disrespect for law.

It was just such action by a prosecutor with which Sutherland had to
deal in Berger v. United States.215 During the trial in the district court, a

counterfeiting prosecution, the prosecuting attorney had misstated facts in
his cross-examination of witnesses, bullied witnesses, and apparently pretended to understand that a witness had said something which he had not.
In writing the opinion of reversal for the Court, Sutherland lectured all
Government attorneys in general. Such an attorney
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore . . .is not that it shall win a case, but that
216
justice shall be done.

Especially here, held Sutherland, in view of the otherwise weak case of the
Government, such conduct could not be permitted to go unchecked. The
"misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative
effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential."2 17
Though the number of their opinions in this area was limited, both
Hughes and Sutherland evidenced devotion to the impartiality theme in
the trial of the accused individual. With them the innocence or guilt
of this individual was one question; the manner in which this innocence
or guilt was established was quite another-and of far greater importance.
210. Id. at 468.
211. Id. at 469.
212. Id. at 470.
213. Various writers have maintained that this whole issue of the extent of the
judge's freedom in such a case boils down to the controversy as to whether the jury
system has outlived its usefulness. See, e.g., Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the
American Jury, 13 MiCH. L. RBv. 302 (1915); Note, 22 CEo. L.J. 324, 341 (1934).
214. PoUND, Csu .riNAL JUSTIcE ixi AmMUCA 186 (1930).
215. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
216. Id. at 88.
217. Id. at 89.
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E. JurisdictionalRights of the Individual
The crucial position occupied by courts in the regulation of our society
and the American belief that this should be so2 18 sometimes renders it
difficult to bear in mind that their far-reaching substantive powers are
for nought unless directed at matters properly within their jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court must decide whether, in particular cases, this jurisdictional
limitation has been observed. Although Sutherland wrote no opinions in
this area, Hughes spoke for the Court in three such cases here to be noted.
In Clairmont v. United States,219 decided during Hughes' first term on
the Court, an Indian who had been convicted of introducing liquor into a
reservation in violation of a federal law pleaded the court's lack of jurisdiction since at the time of his arrest he was still riding on a railroad which
ran through the reservation. Considering this somewhat ingenious defense
for a unanimous Court, Hughes' opinion concluded that indeed the federal
government's grant of right of way to the railroad company had withdrawn
that narrow strip of land from the Indian reservation thereby causing jurisdiction over it to fall to the state where located. As the conviction had
been for actual introduction and as the Indian had thus never entered
Indian territory, the lower court's actions were held to constitute a violation of his jurisdictional rights. Apart from the moral which it affordsavoid being an Indian-giver to Indians-the opinion can be seen as representing an early appreciation by Hughes of the significance of this particular individual protection.
After he became Chief Justice, Hughes wrote his second opinion dealing
with an individual's lack of jurisdiction contention in the popular case of
Blackmer v. United States.2 20 There he considered the propriety of a conr
tempt judgment by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against
Blackmer, a citizen of the United States domiciled in France; the defendant
had been convicted of failing to appear as a witness for the Government in
the criminal case resulting from the Teapot Dome oil scandal. In holding
that the rights of the individual had not been violated by the federal act
which provided for service of subpoena abroad and satisfaction of the
contempt judgment out of his property located within the United States,
Hughes' opinion for the Court22 ' was said to put "at rest a number of
problems which have long needed an authoritative determination." 222
Hughes thought that it could not "be doubted that the United States pos218. One German writer describes this position as follows: "The judge, or the
Federal Supreme Court, thus becomes in the United States the first chamber, wholly
unprovided for in the Constitution, with an absolute right of veto." RoMMmN, THE
NATUnAL LANW 198 (1947).
219. 225 U.S. 551 (1912).
220. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
221. Mr. Justice Roberts did not participate.
222. 30 Micr. L. REv. 968 (1932).
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sesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires
it, and to penalize him in case of refusal" and that the duty of this citizen
to attend courts and give testimony when properly summoned was such
The service of subpoena and notice plus the tender of
an instance.
traveling expenses by a United States Consul constituted the underpinning
of due process upon which the entire proceeding rested. Moreover, contempt was defined as not such a criminal prosecution under the sixth
amendment as to require the presence of the defendant. Hughes brushed
aside the argument that the act limited the use of such subpoena power to
the Government, thus discriminating against defendants, by pointing out
that "the petitioner, a recalcitrant witness, is not entitled to raise the
question."m
Though seemingly indicating a rather harsh approach when contrasted
with his Clairmont opinion, actually the two cases involved situations so
different that such contrast is not feasible. Moreover, it may not be too
farfetched to speculate that as Secretary of State, Hughes may have become
especially sensitive to the difficulties fostered2 by instances of this nature to
the effective administration of law and order. 25
In this jurisdictional rights field it may be as one writer has stated:
"Actually there is no possibility of a conflict of laws as in every case there
is some controlling sovereign force."2 6 However, a more practical outlook
would seem to require a somewhat different formulation: "Experience has
clearly demonstrated . . . that many such problems care little for state
lines."2- 7 At any rate, the final opinion of Hughes here, written for a

unanimous Court in Bowen v. Johnston228 dealt with such a problem. To
be reviewed was the denial by lower federal courts of the petition for
writ of habeas corpus by an individual who had been convicted of murder
in the federal district court in Georgia. Though the offense had been committed in a federal park in the state, the lack of jurisdiction argument was
founded on the contention that the United States did not possess exclusive
jurisdiction over the park. In looking to the cession legislation of Georgia
concerning this park area, Hughes agreed that criminal jurisdiction was
expressly reserved to the State by the original grant. However, he found,
the State twenty-seven years later had passed another cession act purport223. 284 U.S. at 437.
224. Id. at 442.
225. It might be observed that a holding of this nature had been predicted as early
as 1913: "If the sovereign of domicile has this power, it would seem a fortiori that the
sovereign of allegiance would equally have such power ....

." Beale, The Jurlsdiction

of CourtsOver Foreigners,26 HARv.L. REv. 283, 296 (1913).
226. Smith, The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws, 27 GEo. L.J. 536, 542 (1939).
227. Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 Min. L.
Bxv. 752 (1938).
228. 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
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ing to convey exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over any land so
acquired for stated functions "or for any other purposes of government."
Hughes held, on the basis of an opinion which had previously been rendered by the Judge Advocate General, that this open-end provision was
sufficient to vest exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the park in the federal
government, and that hence the individual's petition had been properly
denied. At least two aspects of Hughes' opinion here seem rather strange.
First, the greater portion of the opinion consisted of his struggle to justify
reviewing the case on habeas corpus. Having concluded that struggle, he
then almost summarily denied the petition. Second, he first stated that the
Georgia statutes would decide the jurisdictional problem. In reaching his
final determination, however, he relied wholly upon a federal interpretation of those statutes.
It can thus perhaps be concluded that Hughes' opinions did not evidence
a willingness to skate on thin ice for the individual in the jurisdictional
rights pond. Due to the wholly different situations presented by the three
cases, however, a more definite conclusion would seem unwarranted.
F. The Adequacy of Special Procedures
Though admittedly falling within the "catch-all" realm of this discussion, it does not seem improper that the opinions of Hughes and Sutherland
noticed in this section should be lumped under the above label. For, conceding them to be widely varying both as to fact and law, basically the
common concern is as to the adequacy of procedures unusual to a greater
or lesser extent, whether judicial, legislative, or administrative, in providing
to the individual those fundamental rights to which he can legally lay
claim. The very existence of such opinions should, in a realistic sense,
afford comfort to the ordinary citizen, evidencing as they do the guardianship function performed not only by the two Justices here studied but by
the Court as an institution.
q 2 9 Hughes upIn his opinion for the Court in Graham v. West Virginia,
held the validity of state legislation providing for a procedure, instituted by
information and determined by a jury, whereby additional punishment was
imposed upon a prisoner found to have a prior conviction. Finding such
procedures to be anchored soundly in English history, Hughes thought that
the prisoner was "not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but
the repetition of criminal conduct aggravates [his] ... guilt and justifies
heavier penalties ... ."0 It was unnecessary that this additional punishment be imposed at the time of the prisoner's last conviction for the question as to his previous conviction "is a distinct issue, and it may appropriately be the subject of separate determination."2 3' An indictment was held.
229. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
230. Id. at 623.
231. Id. at 625.
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unessential to the procedure as the commission of an offense was not in
issue. Thus, Hughes concluded, "there is no basis for the contention that
[Graham] ...has been put in double jeopardy or that any of his privileges
232
or immunities as a citizen of the United States have been abridged."
In Burn v. United States22 the Court was called upon to determine
whether a lower court had acted arbitrarily in summarily revoking the
probation of an individual under one sentence because of his misconduct
while serving a prison term under another sentence. In writing the opinion
for this somewhat unusual situation, Hughes examined probation both as
an institution and in terms of the federal act. He came to view probation
as a privilege rather than a right, requiring "an exceptional degree of flexibility" 234 in its revocation as well as its conferment. Still, Hughes declared,
"while probation is a matter of grace, the probationer is entitled to fair
treatment, and is not to be made the victim of whim or caprice."23 5 But,
after holding that probation was not a matter of contract, Hughes found
here an "implied" condition, i.e., no misconduct while serving the other
sentence. Hence it might be argued that this basis for his conclusion to
the effect that though summary, the hearing was not improper or inadequate, was inconsistent with his overall approach to the case. Nevertheless,
the discretion of the lower court was upheld 3 6
Hughes' next opinion showed that he did not possess a closed mind to
the individual in this area. In the case of Berman v. United States237 the
petitioner found himself caught in an appellate log jam. After conviction
in a district court, suspension of sentence and imposition of a two-year
probation order, he had been fearful that the circuit court might dismiss his
appeal. Thus upon his request, the district court reimposed the prior sentence and suspension and added a fine of one dollar to each count, from
which the individual again appealed. The circuit court reached the conclusion that the first sentence had been rendered interlocutory by the second,
and that the second sentence presented no issue for decision as it had been
imposed at the instance of the petitioner. Hughes' opinion for the Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court, holding that as the first sentence had been
a final judgment and properly appealed, the district court had lacked jurisdiction during the pendency of that appeal to impose the second sentence.
232. Id. at 631. The complaint has since been aired that, though Hughes' opinion
in this case settled the validity of these recidivist statutes, "the hostility of judges and
the leniency of jurors have combined to prevent the full operation of the laws in the
courts." Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLuM. L. REv.
238,251 (1948).
233. 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
234. Id. at 220.
235. Id. at 223.
236. For a description of the various aspects of probation as an institution shortly
after this case see Chute, The Progress of Probation and Social Treatment in the
Courts,24 J. Cmnm. L., C. &P.S. 60 (1933).
237. 302 U.S. 211 (1937).
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Observing that the petitioner was a lawyer, subject to disbarment because
of the conviction, Hughes pointed out that "-hs civil rights may be determined solely by reference to the judgment,"2 8 and that "if final judgment
determining his guilt has been rendered, he still has the opportunity to
seek by appeal a reversal of that judgment and thus to secure not an opportunity to reform but vindication."23 9
The case which was cause for Hughes' final opinion in this area, Minne-

sota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,249 involved the effort of an indi-

vidual to halt a probate court's proceeding against him under a state statute
providing for examination and commitment of "psychopathic personalities"
having tendencies toward sexual misconduct. Hughes indicated that but
for the state court's construction, the statute's definition of these personalities might have been void for vagueness. However, he held, that construction to the effect that the statute could be applied only to "those persons
who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced
an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses" 241 must be accepted
by the Supreme Court. The denial of equal protection contention was
quickly disposed of by holding the classification made by the statute to
rest on a "rational basis."2 42 As to due process of law, Hughes declared:
"We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with . .. a psychopathic personality . .. and the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty . . . where the law
though fair on its face . . . may be open to serious abuses in administration .... 243 He concluded, however, that as no particular application of

the statute was contested and as the procedure for examination and commitment set forth appeared fair on its face without construction by the
state court, the individual's procedural objections were premature.
Sutherland wrote three opinions that fall within the bounds of this sec2
tion. The first of these, Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham,
dealt
with the investigatory procedure of the United States Senate, a subject
with which, from experience, he was undoubtedly familiar and perhaps
somewhat sympathetic. Specifically, the Senate issued a warrant commanding that Cunningham be taken into custody and brought before it to answer
questions concerning the election of a senator from Pennsylvania. Cunningham then brought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts on
the ground that he had been arrested for contempt for lawfully refusing to
238. Id. at 213.

239. Ibid.
240. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).

241. Id. at 273. One comment observed: "The Minnesota statute . . . is by far
the broadest piece of legislation on the subject yet to be enacted." 32 J. Crnm. L.,
C. &P.S. 196, 197 (1941).

242. 309 U.S. at 274.
243. Id. at 276-77.
244. 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
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answer certain questions. For a unanimous Court, Sutherland's opinion
reversed the circuit court's agreement with Cunningham. Holding that
the Senate's actions amounted only to an attachment to procure the
relator's attendance and not to a judgment of contempt, Sutherland emphasized the judicial nature of the Senate's powers over elections. As thus
considered and in view of the relator's previous refusals to answer these
questions, the issuance of a subpoena prior to the warrant was found
unnecessary. Likewise, it was impossible to say that the information sought
would not be helpful, for "the presumption in favor of regularity, which
applies to courts, cannot be denied to the proceedings of the Houses of
Congress, when acting upon matters within their constitutional authorforce, denied such rights of
ity."245 Thus Sutherland, with considerable
246
circumstances.
these
in
individual
the
The individual's interest prevailed in his second opinion. The question
certified to the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Benz 247 was
as follows:
After a District Court of the United States has imposed a sentence of imprisonment
upon a defendant in a criminal case, and after he has served a part of the sentence,
has that court, during the term in which it was imposed, power to amend the
sentence by shortening the term of imprisonment?248

Sutherland's opinion for the Court answered in the affimative, holding
that unlike increasing the sentence, which would constitute double
jeopardy, such mitigation was within the court's power. Sweeping away
language seemingly to the contrary in a prior case2 49 upon the ground
that it was limited to a construction of the Probation Act,250 he declined to
discuss "the conflicting state cases [and] . . . the conflicting decisions of
lower federal courts ... -251 Sutherland likewise refuted the Government's
contention that this action by the court was a usurpation of the executive's
pardoning power by defining sentence reduction by amendment as "a
judicial act as much as the imposition of the sentence in the first in2

stance."25
Sutherland's final opinion in the case of Jones v. SEC23 is, of course, a
245. Id. at 619.
246. Four years earlier, Dean Wigmore had pleaded for such a holding, wondering,
"How is intelligent legislation conceivable without the power to compel disclosure of
needful facts?" 19 ILL.L. REv. 452, 453 (1925).
247. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
248. Id. at 306.
249. United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358 (1928).
250. One commentator thought the stroke a little too light here and saw this holding
as challenging the validity of prevailing doctrine. Note, 44 HAnv. L. Rlv. 967, 968
(1931).
251. 282 U.S. at 309.
252. Id. at 311.
253. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
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well-known one. It involved the question whether an individual had the
right to withdraw a registration statement after being notified by the Commission to appear for a hearing thereon. Upholding the existence of such
a right in the individual, Sutherland's opinion for the majority of the
Court2 4 analogized it to that possessed by a plaintiff in a suit at law or
equity which does not cause "plain legal prejudice" to the defendant.sS
There were no adversary parties, and Sutherland could not see how rights
of the general public could be prejudiced by the withdrawal of an application which had never gone into effect. Sutherland then took the opportunity to lecture the C6mmission rather sternly; its action, he declared,
"violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of
personal liberty ultimately rest-that this shall be a government of
laws .... 256 Moreover, as a result of permitted encroachments of admin-

istrative bodies generally, "we shall.. . , while avoiding the fatal eonsequences of a supreme autocracy, become submerged by a multitude of
minor invasions of personal rights, less destructive but no less violative of
2 57
constitutional guaranties."
For a conclusion here based on what Aristotle might have described as
"corrective justice" (distribution based on arithmetic as opposed to
geometry), the results of these special procedure opinions might be tabulated as follows: Of the four opinions written by Hughes, all dealt with
judicial procedures-three holding against and one for the individual; the
most strained being the Burns opinion where Hughes imported the language of contracts to uphold the judge's discretion in matters of probation.
Sutherland's opinions were assorted, dealing with legislative, judicial, and
administrative procedures-in two of which he sided with the individual
and in one against; the forceful language used in the Barry and Jones cases
indicated rather strong, but contrary, feelings on his part in this area.
IV. DIscoRD
Perhaps significant in itself is the fact that of the numerous cases thus far
discussed calling forth opinions by Hughes and Sutherland, in not one is
there found disagreement between the two Justices. Certainly this fact
alone is not here proposed as any sort of test or conclusion, for many of
the opinions were written by each at a time when the other was not on the
Court. Nevertheless, it can simply be stated that there has now been
254.
255.
256.
257.

Justices Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone dissented.
298 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 23.

Id. at 24725. This case had a penchant for raising temperatures. Two years later
Dean Landis, within the confines of three pages, applied the following terms to it:
"the process of thought ...still startles"; "an outburst"; "indicates .. .a field where
calm judicial temper has fled"; "unguarded language"; "invective"; "hyperbole";
"excoriation." LANDis, Tm AnmNSTmRTivE PROCESS 138-40 (1938).
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presented a substantial body of common-ground decisions by the two
Justices in various phases of individual rights.
The object of this section is to show that this unity was not without its
exceptions; there are cases, few but important, in which Hughes and
Sutherland entertain opposing views as to particular rights of the individual. These disagreements are valuable, of course, in relieving one from
being forced to rely entirely, in comparing beliefs of the two Justices, upon
reluctantly drawn predictions founded on the shifting sands of opinions
dealing with situations radically distinguishable. However, after engaging
in such forecasts, it is somewhat reassuring to discover this discord, at
least in a few instances, in areas where one might reasonably have suspected its existence. These cases, in which the two Justices harbored opposing determinations and in which at least one of them wrote an opinion
for his division of the Court, covered a period of time ranging from 1931 to
1937. They will be discussed chronologically.
The only situation affording an instance of direct expressions of conflicting
opinion, i.e., where Sutherland wrote the majority opinion and Hughes the
dissent, was United States v. Macintosh2 8 and its companion, United States
v. Bland. 59 As might reasonably have been expected from previous consideration herein,260 the right of an individual to become a citizen of the
United States was involved. More specifically, the question was whether
an otherwise well qualified applicant for naturalization who would promise to take up arms in defense of the country only with the qualification
that he must personally believe the war to be morally justifiable, came
within the terms of the federal act requiring of the applicant an oath "that
he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance
to the same." Sutherland's opinion exhibited no hesitancy in answering
that he did not. Basing his decision squarely upon the previous case of
United States v. Schwimmer,261 Sutherland conceived citizenship as a privilege subject to whatever conditions Congress might decide to impose.
That Congress had here deemed the duty to bear arms on the part of
such applicants essential, he laid to the reason that though "we are a
Christian people .... " honoring obedience to God, "also, we are a Nation
with a duty to survive. .. whose government must go forward upon the
assumption... that unqualified... submission and obedience to the laws
of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not
262
inconsistent with the will of God."
Hughes, in his opinion for the minority, while expressly refusing to
258. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
259. 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
260. See text accompanying note 109 supra.

261. 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
262. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931).
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reject the Schwimmer decision and while conceding Congress' power to
require an arms-bearing promise of naturalization applicants, contended
that Congress had not so required in fact. And, arguing that the majority
opinion was simply reading this requirement into the Naturalization Act,
Hughes charged an offense which Sutherland dreaded above all othersthat he was encroaching upon a "legislative' function."263 Observing that
"there are other and most important methods of defense, even in time of
war, apart from the personal bearing of arms,"26 4 Hughes asserted that
the naturalization oath was in substance the same as that required of civil
officers generally. He could not bring himself to believe that it had been
Congress' intention to demand "that either citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an obligation to regard allegiance to God as
2 65
subordinate to allegiance to civil power."

The nature of the problem here involved indicates that this was indeed a
decision which might reasonably have fallen upon either side; hence it is
this contrast of the "reasons why" views of the two Justices in this area
which becomes instructive2 66 It will be recalled that it was the interpretation of Hughes which prevailed when, fifteen years later, this case was
67
overruled. 2
Decided only a few days following the Macintosh decision, the famous
case of Near v. Minnesota,268 termed by one authority as "one of the most
important of all the free speech cases in the Supreme Court," 269 presented
the next occasion for Hughes and Sutherland to part company. In the
Court's spotlight was a Minnesota statute which classified scandalous and
defamatory publications as nuisances and, unless the publisher could show
the matters in question to be true and published with good motives, provided for a permanent injunction against their publication. Under this statute
and at the suit of the county attorney, such an injunction had been laid
upon the owner of a periodical which had charged gross inefficiency on
the part of city officials. Hughes, in an opinion for the majority of the
Court which was hailed as establishing "definitely" that freedom of press
was embodied in the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment, 270
invalidated the law. Echoing Blackstone's condemnation of "previous
restraint," Hughes described various aspects of the statute-its applica263. 283 U.S. at 628 (dissenting opinion).
264. Id. at 631.
265. Id. at 634.
266. Professional opinion was likewise divided. Dean Wigmore termed the minority
principle "nothing less than the right of individual secession." United States v. Macintosh-A Symposium, 26 ILL. L. 1Ev. 375, 379 (1931). Professor Green saw the result
of the majority holding as "something that the majority judges read into the Constitution." Id. at 394.
267. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
268. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
269. CnAFEE, FREE SPEECH iN = UNrrED STATES 381 (1941).
270. 30 MIcH. L. REv. 279 (1931).
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tion in stifling criticism of government, the meager defense which it
allowed the individual, and its prohibition of entire future publicationas "the essence of censorship."2 71 Pointing public officers damaged by
false accusations to the libel laws, Hughes thought that the complexity and
importance of modem government "emphasizes the primary need of a
vigilant and courageous press ....- 272
Sutherland joined in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Butler which,
while not denying freedom of the press to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment, argued that the maliciousness of the articles here in question
presented a clear case of abuse of that freedom and required state regulation. The fact that the statute might be applied in a manner repugnant to
this liberty in some future instance should not now, he contended, be
273
considered.
There next followed, in this caravan of conflicts, two cases within an
area where again, it will be recalled from previous examination, 274 discord
might well have been anticipated-the right to trial by jury. The first of
these cases, Dimick v. Schiedt,275 presented the protest of a plaintiff whose
motion for a new trial in a personal injury suit upon the ground of an insufficient jury verdict was denied by the trial judge on the condition that
the defendant agree to a certain increase in the damages. This time it
was Sutherland who wrote the majority opinion, affirming the circuit
court's reversal of the trial judge's actions upon the reasoning that thereby
the plaintiff's right to trial by jury as provided by the seventh amendment
had been abridged.2 76 Holding that that amendment simply adopted the
jury trial rules of the common law as they existed in 1791, Sutherland declared that to allow the judge so to act "is obviously to compel the plaintiff
to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a jury and accept 'an
assessment partly made by a jury which has acted improperly, and partly
271. 283 U.S. at 713.
272.

Id.

at 720. Hughes' opinion here, said one writer, "epitomizes a doctrine to

which he is firmly committed." Hamilton, The Jurist's Art, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 1073,
1085 (1931). Another, however, viewing the decision as settling only a very local
situation, thought that the acclaim given it "by many liberals . .. is not narrowed to
its facts." Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUm.
L. REv. 727, 779 (1942).
273. It has been pointed out that not only Hughes and Sutherland but every
member on the Court switched positions in Near from that which they had occupied
one month earlier in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251
(1931), which had upheld a state statute interfering with freedom of contract. Comment, The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Contract and Freedom of
Speech, 41 YAi. L.J. 262 (1931).
274. See text accompanying notes 205-07 supra.
275. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
276. Many years prior to this case Professor Scott had predicted that such action
by the judge would not be unconstitutional, provided the inadequate verdict was not
a result of compromise or an erroneous instruction. ScoTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PsocEnuRU 126-31 (1922).
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by a tribunal which has no power to assess."' 2 77 In answer to the seemingly
meritorious contention that there was no practical difference in the recognized practice of permitting the judge so to act where the jury verdict was
excessive and here where the verdict was inadequate, Sutherland answered
flatly to the effect that he would prefer to change the former: "[A]ny
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
278
the utmost care."
Hughes concurred in the minority opinion of Mr. Justice Stone whose
entire argument is well summarized by the following sentence: "The sev2 79
enth amendment ... is concerned with substance and not with form";
that is, the precise English rule of 1791, if there had been such a rule, was
not binding here as long as the essentials of a common law jury trial were
preserved. The powers of a trial judge to grant motions for new trial and
to make determinations as to the permissible limits of a recovery must
certainly be sufficient to infuse validity into his actions in this case.280
One might think these opinions to be exactly opposite to what should
have been expected from the previous discussion, i.e., that Sutherland was
upholding, while Hughes would restrict, the individual's unfettered right to
a jury trial. On the other hand, perhaps the most reasonable conclusion is
that Sutherland was adopting a very restrictive approach, while Hughes
conceived the right as adjustable to modem demands. In this view the
immediate result in this particular instance was rather incidental.
The second jury trial case, United States v. Wood,281 involved the validity
under the sixth amendment of a 1935 act of Congress overturning a 1909
Supreme Court decision 282 which had held that an employee of the Government was not qualified to serve as a member of a petit jury in the District of Columbia in criminal trials. Having been convicted of larceny in a
police court by a jury composed in part of three recipients of Government
compensation, the defendant contended that the congressional act was
invalid in denying him the right of trial by an impartial jury. The circuit
court had agreed with the defendant. Hughes' opinion for the majority
reversed the circuit court, holding that the act of Congress had been effective in rendering Government employees competent to serve on such juries
and that no constitutional rights of the defendant had been denied. But
277.
278.
279.
280.

293 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 486.
293 U.S. at 490 (dissenting opinion).
It is deemed sufficient simply to recall summarily Hughes' dissent in Slocum v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 400 (1913), where a majority of the Court held

unconstitutional, on grounds similar to those in this case, the trial judge's entry of a
judgment non obstante veredicto, even though he should have directed a verdict for the
defendant originally. While disagreeing with this holding, Hughes conceded that had
there been facts to be tried by the jury to begin with, the judge would be precluded
from substituting his judgment, other than by granting a new trial.
281. 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
282. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
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it was Hughes' approach in reaching this conclusion which seems somewhat unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of consistency; for the first direction in which he turned for an answer was to "the practice in England
prior to the adoption of the Amendment, or in the colonies"28-the source
which he had held, via Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Dimick, to be practically immaterial. It is true that he also based his conclusion on the alternate
ground that even in the face of such a rule at common law, Congress would
have had the power to change it; but only after disapproving of the
Crawford case because the Court which decided it had not been sufficiently informed of English precedents. Moreover, in supporting his conclusions with the "substance not form" contention which had been advanced
by Stone in Dimick, he did not once refer to that case, decided only a year
previously, where the contention had been rejected. Hughes concluded his
opinion, however, with a discussion of what may well have constituted the
basis for his decision, i.e., the irrationality of automatically imputing bias
284
simply by virtue of Government employment.
Sutherland joined in a brief dissenting statement to the effect that the
holding of the Crawfordcase should control.
In the spring of 1937, when the Supreme Court was being subjected to
the historic attack of President Roosevelt,s it upheld the constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act in a series of decisions which surprised
many. 86 In one of these cases, Associated Press v. NLRB, 287 Hughes and
Sutherland again disagreed on the issue of freedom of press; here however, in contrast to the Near case, it was Sutherland who was claiming the
freedom. The question was whether the act, utilized so as to force A.P. to
reinstate an editorial employee who had been dismissed for union activities, amounted to an unconstitutional abridgment of that freedom. Hughes
silently concurred with the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts which
held that under these circumstances it did not, for "the publisher of a
newspaper.., has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others."288
Sutherland's dissenting opinion distinguished those liberties enumerated
in the fifth amendment and qualified by the phrase "due process of law,"
from the first amendment freedoms which he saw as "guaranteed without
283. 299 U.S. at 134.
284. The soundness of extending the holding in this case to other types of trials
was later criticized. The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARv. L. Ruv. 114, 126

(1950).

285. See 1 FnRuND, SuTrm.amN, HowE & BnowN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 241-43
1954); JACKSON, ThE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICUL SUPPXMACY (1941).
286. "[T]hese decisions are indeed surprising reversals of judicial attitude toward the
exercise of federal power." Note, The Wagner Act Decisions Studied in Retrospect, 32
ILL. L. REv. 196 (1937).
287. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
288. Id. at 132-33.
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qualification." These latter rights, including freedom. of the press, thus
stood "in a category apart... incapable of abridgment by any process of
law."2 9 Echoing his Carter Coal Co. opinion,290 Sutherland would place
very strict limitations upon Congress' power to regulate the relations of
private employer and employee. Obviously, he thought, this limitation
had here been exceeded for "if freedom of the press does not include the
right to adopt and pursue a policy without governmental restriction, it is
a misnomer to call it freedom."2 91
The final instance of discord between the two Justices over rights of the
individual arose, several months prior to Sutherland's retirement, in the case
of Nardone v. United States.29 2 Involved was the somewhat sensitive question of the admissibility in federal courts of evidence obtained by Government agents by means of wire tapping; more specifically, the problem was
whether the Court's decision in Olmstead v. United States293 to the effect
that such evidence was admissible had been changed by Congress through
a provision in the Federal Communications Act to the effect that "no person" should intercept and divulge communications to "any person." Mr.
Justice Roberts' opinion for the majority of the Court, in which Hughes
joined, held that the change had been effected and that the evidence was
not now admissible. To the contentions that the word "person" in the act
should not be construed to include federal agents and that indeed the
act itself had merely provided for a transfer of jurisdiction between regulatory agencies, the majority replied that in the uncertainty created by the
controversy over the morality of wire tapping, these considerations could
94
not be deemed controlling
Remaining faithful to his majority position in the Olmstead case, Sutherland here wrote a dissenting opinion which was somewhat reminiscent of
his agreement with Mr. Justice Butler's dissent in Near v. Minnesota.295
The power of federal law enforcement officers to obtain evidence in this
manner was one, he said, which was necessary for the protection of society
as a whole. As Congress had not expressly forbidden the practice, the
ambiguous word "person" should not be given a meaning which might well
have been not intended. Citing words of Mr. Justice Story to the effect that
"the general words of a statute ought not to include the government, or
289. 301 U.S. at 135 (dissenting opinion).
290. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
291. 301 U.S. at 137 (dissenting opinion).

292. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
293. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
294. It appears that this holding of the majority was generally criticized. It was
said to indicate "a thoroughly unrealistic approach," Editorial Note, 6 GEo. WAsH. L.
Rlv. 326, 329 (1938); an instance of the Court's "leaning over backward," The
Supreme Court of the United States, 28 GEo. L.J. 789, 792 (1940); a change by the
Court in "moral considerations," 86 U. PA. L. REv. 436, 437 (1938).
295. 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (dissenting opinion).
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affect its rights . .. ,"296 Sutherland condemned the majority's holding as
empty of "all sense of proportion" and submerging the necessity of public
297 It is of
protection against crime "by an overflow of sentimentality."
iterest that both sides of the Court placed the problem for decision in
exactly the same setting. The very uncertainty which forced the majority
into holding the evidence inadmissible was relied upon by the minority to
urge a contrary result.2 9 8
It becomes clear then that with Hughes, Sutherland, and the rights of
the individual, all were not at one; discord, infrequently but persistently,
is found. But rather than concluding from this discord that one of the
Justices was more sympathetic to these rights than the other, one finds
that he must adhere more strictly than ever to the warning issued by Professor Freund: "In some cases it is far from clear with which side the
interests of civil liberty are to be identified."299
V. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this paper quotations were set forth which seemed to
indicate directly opposing philosophies of the proper approach to statutory
interpretation on the parts of Justices Hughes and Sutherland. The fundamental question was then posed as to the probability, indeed the possibility,
of judges who subscribed to such conflicting theories and who emerged
from such contrasting backgrounds being able to reach anything resembling
consistent agreement in any particular area of the law.
Since then the two Justices have been followed through a myriad of
opinions held together by one common link-their concern, or lack of concern, for the rights of the individual. It has been attempted not only to
present a fairly complete summary of their views on this important subject,
but to afford some idea of the general fact of outside approval or disapproval of these views, both at the time of their revelation and in light of
later developments. Summary comparisons and contrasts of the indicated
beliefs of the two Justices have been interspersed throughout, whenever
there was thought to be sufficient common thread to make possible the
weaving.
At this point the conclusion seems forthcoming that the indicated difference in approaches was a reality. Not only in the interpretation of laws
but in approaching situations in general, with the exception of a very few
detours on the part of both, Sutherland would travel the more restrictive
296. 302 U.S. at 386 (dissenting opinion).
297. Id. at 387.

298. For an account of the extent

to which this decision was later carried by the

Court see Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 481, 535 (1946).
299. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rv. 533, 534
(1951).
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and Hughes the less literal road to a solution of the problem at hand. And
yet it is submitted that once that solution was reached, with thoughtprovoking consistency it was the individual's interest which prevailed.
In the light of their opinions alone (for a line must be drawn somewhere)
it would be difficult to conceive of Hughes' being more sensitive and alert
to the possibilities of encroachment upon individual liberties than he was.
But Sutherland was not as far behind as the lack of complimentary literature would lead one to believe. Taken together, their opinions fill a vast
gap in the theretofore unestablished or unsettled phases of judicial respect
for the common man.
The two Justices have been observed moving almost as one against
statutes whose vagueness was capable of operating to the disadvantage of
the working man; molding precedents protecting man's right of expression
which remain vitally alive today; and hurling a flat refusal to the demand
for liberty sacrifices in return for the conviction of criminals. Likewise in
concurrence were their opinions in demanding that proper conduct by
federal court officials which insures a defendant basic impartiality; in
maintaining a watchful vigilance over those special procedures where a
curtailment of individual interests is always a possibility; and in joining arm
in arm to establish requirements for fairness in state trial procedures for
such offenders as the Scottsboro boys.
With the maintenance of independent standards for these individual
rights, discord between the two Justices in certain areas was more than a
remote contingency. For example, Hughes' undeniably more liberal approach in favor of the individual under the general heading of citizenship
and naturalization has been noticed. And in the realm of trial by jury,
while the contributions of both Justices were considerable, Sutherland's
philosophy appeared the more restrictive.
In certain subject areas, however important, enough common ground to
render feasible a comparison was simply lacking. Here may be included
such areas as statutory presumptions, color cases, and jurisdictional limitations.
Finally then, does not the negative answer to the fundamental question
analyzed in this article serve to cast Mr. Justice Cardozo's "eyesight confession" 300 in the role of a premise rather than a conclusion? Moreover,
can not this premise be utilized as one of the stones in the foundation of
our system of judicial review rather than in bringing to the top what some
may consider its weaker side? For as this study would tend to indicate,
starting with the premise, the expected conclusion by no means necessarily
follows. Thus while our key position of judge necessarily and properly is
filled by a human being, entering the Court not from a secluded greenhouse, but from one of the many main streets of life, at bottom there re300. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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-mains the assurance that case law as we know it consists of'far more than
the haphazard bredking of personality-inspired judicial deadlocks.

